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environment that is characterized by a high level of government intervention, a weak legal
system, and an underdeveloped financial market. We study how institutional factors, such as
the ultimate owner and level of market development, shape the role of these business groups.
We find that business groups help member firms overcome constraints in raising external
capital, and that the internal capital market within a business group is more likely to be an
alternative financing channel among state-owned firms than among private firms. We also
find that the internal capital market is more likely to help those affiliated firms which are
private, local government owned relative to those owned by central government, or located in
regions with a well-developed institutional environment. We present evidence of the role of
business groups in risk sharing among affiliated firms, but find that business group affiliation
has no impact on firm accounting performance. This study sheds new light on the theory of the
firm and its boundaries, and provides a better understanding of China's rapidly growing
economy.
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A striking feature of most emerging economies is the prominent role played by business groups. Khanna and Rivkin (2001)
define a business group as “a set of firms which, though legally independent, are bound together by a constellation of formal and
informal ties and are accustomed to taking coordinated action.” Granovetter (2005), Khanna and Yafeh (2007), and Morck et al.
(2005) review the literature on business groups. Khanna and Palepu (2000a) argue that business groups serve as an
organizational response to the weak institutional context of emerging economies. Financial transactions can be particularly costly
in emerging economies because of weak investor protection, contract enforcement, communication, and information disclosure.
A business group serves as an internal financial market through which capital can be allocated among affiliated firms, which can
lead to economic benefits, especially when external financing is scarce and uncertain. Bena and Ortiz-Molina (2013) suggest that
business groups in the form of pyramids provide a financing advantage in setting up new firms when the pledgeability of cash
flows from outside financiers is limited. Khanna and Palepu (2000a) find that affiliates of the most highly diversified Indian
business groups outperform stand-alone firms, indicating that internal capital markets within Indian groups effectively mimic thee terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License, which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and
uthor and source are credited.
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Published by Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
167J. He et al. / Journal of Corporate Finance 22 (2013) 166–192functions provided by financial markets in advanced economies. Based on evidence from postwar Japan as well as two emerging
markets, Korea and Thailand, Khanna and Yafeh (2005)1 contend that risk sharing is another important function of business
groups. However, such groups also have a dark side. The business group structure can be a value destroyer. For example, through
tunneling among group members in a pyramid structure, one large and influential firm may be propped up at the expense of
other “weak”members in the group (La Porta et al., 1999; Morck et al., 2005). The empirical results of business groups are mixed,2
and thus consensus has not yet been reached concerning the net advantages that might result from affiliation with a business
group. This study of business groups in China aims to contribute to the unresolved debate regarding the role of business groups.
China seems a natural candidate for analyzing the internal capital market role of business groups. First, these groups contribute
close to 60% of the nation's industrial output (China Development Research Center of the State Council, 2000; National Bureau of
Statistics of China, 2000). By 2006, therewere 2856 officially recognized business groups in Chinawith 27,950 directly owned first tier
subsidiaries, employing around 30 million people (State Statistical Bureau, 2002A–2007A).Whereasmany prior studies confine their
analysis to the largest business groups, such as the big six keiretsus in Japan and top 30 chaebols in South Korea (Chang and Choi,
1988; Chang andHong, 2000; Prowse, 1992), our study encompasses business groups of all sizes.We include all publicly traded group
affiliates in China. The rich financial data of these listed firms yield relatively unbiased results. Second, investor protection in China is
among the worst worldwide. Allen et al. (2005) compare overall investor protection (defined as the sum of overall creditor rights,
shareholder rights, rule of law, and government corruption) in mainland China relative to the countries included in La Porta et al.
(1998), and find that China, alongwithMexico and Indonesia, ranks the lowest in overall investor protection. In countries with weak
investor protection, arm's-length contracting andmarket monitoring is very costly, if not impossible. In addition, external capital can
be expensive and scarce or even unavailable. In such context, a business groupmay have extensive governance functions, creating an
internal capital market and ensuring close monitoring of management decisions. Third, China has maintained a state-dominated
financial system in which government at various levels controls the allocation of financial resources in both the banking sector and
securities market. Government-guided financial resource allocation usually favors a few large-scale state-owned enterprises that are
important to the economic development of the country and the specific region. State-owned firms may also face the problem of soft
budget constraints. It is difficult formost non-state enterprises to secure financing through the state-controlled financial system. Thus,
they suffer from serious financial repression. In such a context, a business group is likely to serve as an internal capital market to
mitigate the financial constraints faced by private firms. Finally, the benefits of a business group might be totally different between
emerging markets and developed economies, given that the optimal corporate structure depends on the institutional environment.
One prominent characteristic of China is the very uneven distribution of economic and legal development across the country. Natural
and human capital resources account for some of the differences in development across regions. Political connections with the
country's leadership elite are also very important, and great variation in regional per capita income and education levels contribute to
the vast differences in development across the country. We believe that the differences in regional market development have
profound effects on the role of business groups.
We address the following issues in this research: (1) whether group-affiliated firms are less likely to face financial constraints
than stand-alone ones; (2) whether a member of a business group is more likely to share risk than an independent firm;
(3) whether group-affiliated firms tend to outperform unaffiliated ones; and (4) how the ultimate owner, institutional factors,
and level of market development shape the role of business groups in China.
Our results show that in China, business group-affiliated firms have a lower level of investment–cash flow sensitivity than
their stand-alone counterparts, and that the internal capital market role of business groups is more significant among
state-owned firms and those in regions with a well-developed market. Group-affiliated firms also bear less risk than stand-alone
ones in terms of operating volatility, bankruptcy, or the possibility of financial distress, and this effect is more prominent among
privately owned firms and those located in regions with a less developed market. Regarding performance, the positive signs are
consistent with our expectation that group-affiliated firms tend to outperform unaffiliated ones in terms of ROA and ROE,
although the statistical significance of these results is relatively weak compared to that of the results of the financial constraint
and risk-sharing tests.
We perform a battery of robustness checks, and investigate whether the inclusion of financial institutions or foreign listed
shares (H-shares in our sample) in a business group affects our results. We also examine the impact of a group's level of
diversification on our results. In addition to investment–cash flow sensitivity, we adopt an alternative measure of financial
constraints using the generalized method of moments (GMM) framework of Whited and Wu (2006). Finally, we employ the
Heckman (1979) two-stage test to address the problem of potential self-selection bias among business groups.
This study is associated with several strands of the literature. First, we contribute to the business group literature by using
Chinese data. We investigate the role of a business group as an internal capital market and in risk sharing and firm performance.
More importantly, we examine how ownership type and institutional factors shape the role of a business group. Second, the
results of this study contribute to the internal capital market literature.3 We find that business groups in China act as internal
capital markets and mitigate the financial constraints faced by group affiliates, especially state-owned firms and those located in
regions or provinces with well-developed markets. Third, this research also contributes to the literature on investment–cash flow
sensitivity (Fazzari et al., 1988). A general finding of the literature is the importance of internal funds as the main source of capital1 The risk-sharing role of business groups is also discussed in Gopalan et al. (2007) and Marisetty and Subrahmanyam (2010).
2 See Buysschaert et al. (2004), Campbell and Keys (2002), Chang and Choi (1988), Choi and Cowing (1999), Ferris et al. (2003), Khanna and Palepu (2000b),
Lee and Lee (2002), Lee et al. (2000), and Lee et al. (2001).
3 See Hoshi et al. (1991), Rajan et al. (2000), Scharfstein and Stein (2000), Shin and Stulz (1998), Stein (1997), and Williamson (1985).
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firm will rely on its own funds. Our results show that group affiliates have a lower level of investment–cash flow sensitivity,
implying fewer financial constraints and more dependence on internal capital markets. Affiliation with a business group is a
substitute for costly external financing in China. Finally, this study complements the Chinese corporate finance and business
group research. Several papers have investigated business groups in China.4 One major challenge to Chinese business group
research, however, is the definition of a business group. For historical reasons, many large group corporations were formed under
the direction of the central or local governments. These corporations typically have a broad scope, with many subsidiaries in
distinct industries, and act more like conglomerates in the United States. Some research is based on these corporations. Other
studies identify business groups based on parent–subsidiary ownership structure. One concern is that some parent companies are
not listed on exchanges, so their financial information is not available. Therefore, prior Chinese business group research suffers
from the problems of different group definitions and a lack of financial information. However, we include all business
group-affiliated firms whose stock is publicly traded. Our analysis provides useful information about firm structure that is
otherwise difficult to obtain.
The practical implications of our results are numerous, especially for the policy experiments related to business groups that are
currently underway in China. Allen et al. (2005) argue that China is an important counterexample to the findings in the law,
finance, and growth literatures. China is one of the fastest growing economies in the world, although neither its legal nor its
financial system is well developed. Thus, it is argued that the role of different factors in contributing to the growth process is not
well understood. We contend that the business group may serve as an alternative channel for firms to grow, especially those in
regions or provinces with less developed markets.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we briefly introduce the background of Chinese business
groups and their institutional structure. In Section 3, we develop our hypotheses and discuss our methodologies. In Section 4, we
describe the dataset. In Section 5, we present the empirical results, and in Section 6, the results of the robustness checks. We
conclude the paper in Section 7.2. Business groups and institutional factors in China
2.1. Business groups in China
The formation of Chinese business groups originates with China's market-oriented reform. In the mid-1980s, the Chinese
government started to promote business groups because it believed that such groups could absorb new technology, deliver stable
financial performance, and achieve international competitiveness. By the early 1990s, there were more than 7000 known groups
in China, with total assets amounting to 1.12 trillion Yuan (135.70 billion U.S. dollars).5 As mentioned in the Introduction, some
of these groups do not exactly fit the definition of a business group proposed by Khanna and Rivkin (2001), as they are not legally
independent from each other and act more like the conglomerates in the United States. As for the others, although they are
business groups with legally independent member affiliates, underdeveloped corporate disclosure practices have prevented
comprehensive analysis of their operational and financial performance. This is why prior research mostly uses a relatively small
sample and the analysis is limited to some simple financial measures.6
In the early 1990s, China's capital market developed substantially. Two stock exchanges were established and corporations
could have their shares listed and traded publicly. Some group affiliates also began to be listed. Unlike conglomerates in the
United States, in which individual lines of business typically are not observable, each exchange-listed group-affiliated firm in
China is a distinct legal entity that publishes its own financial statements, has its own board of directors, and is responsible to its
own shareholders. Hence, we can clearly identify firms that are group affiliated by their corporate structure. The financial
information pertaining to these firms is audited and disclosed regularly, which yields rich financial data for analysis. Fig. 1
demonstrates the corporate structure of a business group, Fosun Group, which has three affiliated domestic listed firms and two
listed firms in Hong Kong. Based on our definition, the three domestic listed firms are group affiliated.7 The structure of business
groups varies across countries, with differences in both formal ownership links, including the ownership roles of banks, families,
the state, and other companies, and the nature and strength of informal social networks (Morck et al., 2005). For example, Korean
chaebols are characterized by private family ownership with limited bank involvement, whereas Japanese keiretsus are
characterized by multiple corporate owners, often centered on a lead bank (Gedajlovic and Shapiro, 2002). In this paper, we
include all publicly traded affiliated firms so that we can obtain the necessary data to gain a clear picture about each business
group.84 See Carney et al. (2009), Fan et al. (2008), Guest and Sutherland (2010), Keister (1998), and Smyth (2000).
5 Please refer to State Commission on Reforming the Economic System, 1993. Also, as mentioned by Keister (1998), Chinese business groups can be divided into
two types: small groups (often private ﬁrms) and large groups (primarily state-owned ﬁrms that resemble Japanese keiretsus).
6 For example, Keister (1998) includes only China's 40 largest business groups and 535 member ﬁrms in the 1988–90 period.
7 We include only those ﬁrms that are listed on the Shanghai and Shenzhen exchange, and do not include those ﬁrms with shares traded in other markets, such
as Hong Kong (H-shares) and the United States.
8 For example, Carney et al. (2009) use the data of 476 publicly listed ﬁrms in 1999 and those of 467 matched ﬁrms in 2004 to ﬁnd support for a temporal
hypothesis that afﬁliation with a business group improves performance, but that the value of group afﬁliation declines over time. Guest and Sutherland (2010)
identify China's most important business groups (the 100 plus “national champion” trial groups) and investigate the performance of their listed subsidiaries. They
ﬁnd that the listed subsidiaries of these national champions outperform non-afﬁliated ﬁrms.
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China has maintained a state-dominated financial system in which the government at various levels controls the allocation of
financial resources in both the banking sector and securities market. The banking system in China comprises the central bank, four
large state-owned commercial banks, three policy banks, ten national joint-stock commercial banks, about 90 regional
commercial banks, and about 3000 urban and 42,000 rural credit cooperatives. There are also branches or representative offices of
foreign banks with limited activities. Overall, the four state-owned commercial banks dominate the market. The stock market in
China is also controlled by the government. An initial public offering (IPO) quota system was adopted in China in 1993. The State
Planning Commission determines the quantity of equity to be issued each year, and the China Securities Regulatory Commission
(CSRC) then divides this quota up among the provinces and ministries. A company seeking to go public has to be selected by a
provincial government or ministry with a quota before asking the CSRC for approval. Local authorities often split the issuing
proceeds to allow more firms to be listed within the quota limit. In 1996, the quota system was changed from restricting the
quantity of equity to restricting the number of firms to be listed. Government-guided financial resource allocation usually favors a
few large-scale state-owned enterprises that are important to the economic development of the country or the specific region.
Smaller state-owned andmost non-state enterprises find it difficult to secure financing from the state-controlled financial system.
Thus, they suffer from serious financial repression.
One institutional characteristic of the stock market in China is that listed companies are sponsored and controlled by
government-related entities. Most listed companies are business units that have been carved out of state-owned enterprises
(SOEs). As a controlling shareholder, the state often has multiple and conflicting objectives. On the one hand, the state wishes its
firms to become as competitive and efficient as privately owned enterprises. This inevitably involves the closing of money-losing
operations and the laying off of surplus employees. On the other hand, the state has responsibility to maintain the level of
employment because laying off workers from state-controlled firms places a huge burden on the state in the short run and thus
may not be politically and economically feasible, even though such layoffs may create net positive social benefits over the long
run. In contrast, private firms have a strong incentive to improve performance and little interest in providing social stability. As a
result, we expect to see that business groups play different roles in SOEs and private firms. Bai et al. (2006) argue that the central
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only a fraction of the external benefits of social stability due to labor migration and regional interdependence in the financial
system. However, the central government internalizes all of the external effects of social stability and has a strong incentive to
maintain social stability. Thus, we also expect to see business groups play different roles in local and central SOEs.
Research shows that institutional factors can affect financial market development and economic growth. These factors include
prevailing economic conditions, the way firms are governed, institutional and regulatory frameworks, and the legal environment
(investor protection, legal enforcement). One characteristic of China's reform is the very uneven distribution of economic and
legal development across the country. Natural and human capital resources account for some of the regional differences in
development, but political connections with the country's leadership elite are also very important. We believe that the differences
in regional development have profound effects on the role of business groups. To examine this, we explicitly account for market
development using a set of indexes designed to capture differences in economic, political, legal, and institutional factors across
regions. The advantage of conducting an inter-region study within one country is that we can capture the effect of institutions on
the role of business groups without contamination due to country differences in accounting rules, taxation, and bankruptcy laws.
However, we admit that there are differences in industry composition, population, education level, infrastructure, etc. between
regions. This could be a potential weakness of our study if we do not control for them, as it is possible that some of them, such as
industry composition or infrastructure, may influence a firm's risk level and performance along with the role of business groups.
The local and central governments adopt different policies to balance the uneven development across regions. In addition, we use
the fixed effect OLS regression and the m-index to capture differences in economic, political, legal, and institutional factors across
regions. We believe the omitted variable issue in capturing the regional difference should not significantly affect our results.
3. Hypothesis development and methodology
3.1. Business groups and ﬁnancial constraints
In a perfect market without asymmetric information or financial constraints, a firm's cash flow should not affect its capital
investment. The joint effect of asymmetric information, managerial agency problems, and transaction costs can cause a disparity
between the cost of internal and external funds. Under such financial constraints, investment decisions depend on the availability
of internal funds. Business groups can be seen as organizational forms that mitigate the asymmetric information and contract
enforcement problems that arise in accessing external financial resources. Business groups allow the formation of internal capital
markets that can partially replace the capital allocation function of external markets. A group can pool funds from different
affiliates and reallocate them to the most profitable uses. Business groups can create value by allowing affiliated firms to allocate
capital and managerial resources more efficiently within the same group in an environment in which the external capital and
labor markets are underdeveloped. An internal market can contain superior information about investment opportunities
(Williamson, 1975), allow the renegotiation of debts in the case of financial distress, and provide efficient monitoring. It can also
provide credible information about group members, which reduces the risk of opportunism and lowers contract enforcement,
searching, and screening costs. Studies show that investment is strongly and positively related to firms' cash flow, measured as
net income plus depreciation, after controlling for proxies for investment opportunities. In addition, investment–cash flow
sensitivity is greater among firms a priori classified as being more financially constrained. For instance, Fazzari et al. (1988) find
that investment is positively related to firms' cash flow, and that the coefficient is larger among firms with low dividend payouts
relative to those with high payouts. Hoshi et al. (1991) find that investment is less sensitive to cash flow among firms that are
members of a keiretsu and are presumed to be less financially constrained. Prowse (1992) also finds that a Japanese firm's strong
link to an industrial group leads to reductions in agency and monitoring costs as well as liquidity constraints. Shin and Park
(1999) find that firms affiliated with Korean chaebols have greater access to investment capital than stand-alone, independent
firms. Based on the above evidence, we propose the following internal market hypothesis:
Hypothesis 1. Group-affiliated firms in China are less likely to face financial constraints (low level of investment–cash flow
sensitivity) than independent ones, ceteris paribus.
To investigate the effect of business group affiliation on investment–cash flow sensitivity, we use the same approach as those
of Fazzari et al. (1988) and Hoshi et al. (1991). They regress investment on Tobin's Q, cash flow, lagged cash flow, and other
control variables and interpret differences in the investment–cash flow relationship between different groups of firms as evidence
of financial constraints. We adopt the following basic panel specification:Iit
Kit−1
¼ α þ β1Qit−1 þ β2
CFit
Iit−1
þ β3
CFit−1
Iit−2
þ β4
CFit
Iit−1
þ CFit−1
Iit−2
 
 BGit þ β5Cashit−1 þ β6Salesit−1 þ β7Levit−1 þ uit ð1Þ
I represents investment in plant and equipment during period t; K is the beginning-of-period gross book value of netwhere
property, plant, and equipment; CF represents the current period cash flow to the firm as measured by net income plus
depreciation plus the change in deferred taxes; and Q represents Tobin's Q. BG is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the firm is
affiliated with a business group in period t, and 0 if it stands alone. We include the fixed effects for each firm and each year to
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influences. Cash holding (Cash) is defined as the ratio of the sum of cash and marketable securities to the beginning-of-period
total book value of assets to capture the effect of corporate liquidity on investment. The net sales-to-total assets ratio (Sales) is
included to control for production or output effect on investment.9 The importance of controlling for firm leverage (Lev) is
suggested by Lang et al. (1996), who document a negative relationship between investment and leverage.
In this specification of the model, β2 and β3 measure investment–cash flow sensitivity among stand-alone firms, and
β2 + β3 + β4 represents the cash flow coefficients of group-affiliated firms. Therefore, if β4 differs significantly from zero, then
we can conclude that there is a difference in cash flow sensitivity between group affiliates and stand-alone companies.
Furthermore, according to Hypothesis 1, we expect β4 to be negative, which implies that group affiliates face fewer financial
constraints.
3.2. Business groups and risk sharing
Business groups can also benefit member firms by facilitating risk sharing through the transfer of resources from a
well-performing affiliate to a poorly performing one during times of financial distress. Prowse (1992) argues that group affiliates
assist member firms that are suffering from adverse economic conditions to ensure the group's long-term survival, while Shin and
Park (1999) hold that financial cross guarantees link the members of a business group and provide the basis for an internal capital
market. Thus, a failing member has recourse to other sources of funding, which can insulate it from the discipline of the
marketplace. Friedman et al. (2003) provide evidence that the controlling shareholders of a business group prop up affiliated
firms during a crisis, using their private funds or group-wide savings. Chang and Hong (2000) find that profitable affiliates prop
up or cross-subsidize poorly performing affiliates using various forms of intra-group transactions, including cash injections, debt
guarantees, and/or equity investments. Khanna and Yafeh (2005) find evidence of the risk-sharing role of business groups in
several emerging economies including Brazil, Korea, Taiwan, Thailand, and India. Thus, we propose the following hypothesis of
the risk-sharing role played by business groups:
Hypothesis 2. Group-affiliated firms in China are more likely to share risk than independent ones.
We adopt two proxies for risk sharing: operating profit volatility and likelihood of bankruptcy or financial distress. To
implement the test, we develop the following two hypotheses.
Hypothesis 2a. Group-affiliated firms in China are more likely to have a lower level of operating profit volatility than
independent ones.
The mutual insurance among group-affiliated firms leads to their smoother operating performance. We compare the volatility
of operating profitability of group affiliates with that of otherwise comparable unaffiliated companies using the following
specification:9 Hos
support
(1987)
ﬁnanciaStdOpi ¼ α þ β1Sizei þ β2Opi þ β3BGi þ ui: ð2Þ
is the standard deviation of each firm's operating profit, and OP is the firm's average operating profit. The standardStdOp
deviation of profit is calculated based on the number of time series observations available. Thus, different firms may have periods
of different length. We adopt weighted regression, where the number of observations per firm is used as the weight. BG is a
dummy variable to denote group affiliation. If Hypothesis 2a holds, then we expect a negative β3, which implies that group
affiliation plays a role in smoothing operating performance.
Hypothesis 2b. Group-affiliated firms in China are less likely to face bankruptcy or financial distress than independent ones.
Khanna and Yafeh (2005) show that Indian business groups smooth liquidity across firms through intra-group loans. Kim and
Hoskisson (1996) argue that business groups represent a risk-sharing mechanism through which distressed firms receive
assistance from member firms. If group support is effective in preventing firm default, then group-affiliated firms are likely to
have a lower incidence of bankruptcy or likelihood of financial distress than stand-alone firms. Based on the bankruptcy
prediction literature, we use financial ratios that are intended to capture firm profitability, liquidity, and market value as controls.
We run the following pooled multivariate logistic regression:Logit p Bankruptcyit ¼ 1ð Þ ¼ α þ γ Firm Financialsit þ βBGit þ industryþ timeþ uit : ð3Þhi et al. (1991) argue that it is an “accelerator effect,” which is important in the empirical investment literature despite the lack of compelling theoretical
. They refer to Jorgenson (1971), saying that real output emerges as the single most important determinant of investment. Schiantarelli and Georgoutsos
note that when ﬁrms have a monopoly, power lagged production should be related to current investment. Given that we do not have precise data on ﬁrms'
l goods inventories, following Hoshi et al. (1991), we use sales, which is scaled by total assets, in the role of production variable.
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regulatory authorities in the year concerned, and 0 otherwise.10 According to the rules governing ST designation, if an ST firm
cannot turn its business around and make a profit in two years, then it will be delisted. The firm's financial ratios we use are: Net
Income/Total Assets, Working Capital/Total Assets, and Market Value of Equity/Total Liabilities. We also include Size, and
Leverage, as measured by Debt/Total Assets. If the risk-sharing function of business affiliation is effective, then β should be
significantly negative.
3.3. Business groups and ﬁrm performance
Business groups can exert both a positive and a negative impact on firm performance; hence, it is not clear whether they
should be cast as “paragons or parasites” (Khanna and Yafeh, 2007). As discussed above, an internal capital market provides
funding and an insurance advantage to group affiliates. Business groups can also attain sufficient scope and scale to internalize
soft market infrastructure and offer services such as management training, finance, technology, marketing, and logistics services
to their affiliates (Fisman and Khanna, 2004). However, business group affiliation can create severe agency problems, and thus
destroy firm value. The complex structure of business groups is conducive to self-dealing transactions and makes it difficult for
outside investors to monitor these transactions. As a result, group-affiliated firms have more opportunities and tools than
unaffiliated firms to divert firm resources through related party transactions at the expense of minority shareholders. These
agency problems can be exacerbated in an environment of weak disclosure requirements, poor corporate governance, and lax law
enforcement, and in an inefficient market for corporate control. In summary, business groups can expropriate minority
shareholders, engage in rent-seeking behavior, exert market power, and act as internal capital markets to subsidize poorly
performing affiliates or new ventures. Therefore, it is hard to draw a clear-cut conclusion regarding the net advantage of group
affiliation for the operation and performance of members of business groups.
The results of research that gauges the relative performance of group-affiliated firms are mixed. Prowse (1992) reports that
the return on assets is lower among Japanese keiretsu firms than among non-keiretsu firms, and Lins and Servaes (1999) find that
keiretsu-affiliated Japanese firms experience a value loss due to conglomerating. In contrast, Chang and Choi (1988) find that the
firms affiliated with a diversified group in Korea are more profitable, and Khanna and Palepu (2000a, 2000b) find that in India and
Chile, the firms of the most diversified business groups outperform all other firms. Khanna and Rivkin (2001) determine that
group affiliation is positively associated with performance in some countries whereas its effect is either negative or insignificant
in others.
Thus, ex ante, it is unclear whether members of business groups outperform independent firms. If the net advantage of
business group affiliation is positive, then we would expect to find that group-affiliated firms tend to outperform unaffiliated
ones. However, if the net advantage of such affiliation is negative, then we would expect to find that group-affiliated firms tend to
underperform unaffiliated ones. Therefore, our hypothesis is nondirectional, and we address this issue empirically:
Hypothesis 3. The performance of group-affiliated firms in China is systematically different from that of independent ones.
To address Hypothesis 3 econometrically, we run the following regression model to investigate the relationship between firm
performance and business group affiliation after controlling for a number of other firm characteristics including firm size, cash
flow, beta risk, and capital structure,10 The
an ST ﬁ
years afPerformanceit−α þ β1BGit þ β2
CFit
Iit−1
þ β3Sizeit þ β4Betait þ β5
LTDit
Kit−1
þ β6
STDit
Kit−1
þ uit : ð4ÞWe use the stock market (Tobin's Q) and accounting measures (ROA and ROE) of performance to determine the effects of
group affiliation. We define Tobin's Q as the ratio of a firm's market value to book value. ROA is the ratio of a firm's net income to
the beginning-of-period total assets. ROE is defined as the ratio of a firm's net income to the beginning-of-period book equity
value. Size is defined as a firm's logarithmic total assets. Beta is a firm's stock beta coefficient on market index during the past
100 weeks. LTD is long-term debt, and STD is short-term debt. Other variable definitions are the same as the previous
specifications. Our focus is on the estimate of β1. Its sign and magnitude imply the net advantage of affiliation to a business group
in China.
3.4. Business groups and institutional factors
In Section 2, we explain that the Chinese state-dominated financial system favors state-owned firms. Private firms receive low
priority from either the banking sector or equity markets in getting external funding for their investment projects. Therefore, if a
private firm is group affiliated, then it is likely to show a greater marginal effect than a state-owned firm, ceteris paribus. Businessspecial treatment (ST) system was introduced by the China Securities and Regulatory Commission in 1998. Under this system, a listed company is labeled
rm if it has experienced ﬁnancial losses for two consecutive ﬁscal years or is technically insolvent. If it cannot return to proﬁt-making status within two
ter being labeled an ST ﬁrm, then it is labeled a particular transfer (PT) ﬁrm, the shares of which can only be traded on Friday, or may even face de-listing.
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firms in China by providing insurance and cross funding to them. Hence, we posit the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 4. The role played by business groups in China as internal capital markets and in risk sharing and firm performance is
more pronounced among private than among non-private firms.
To test this hypothesis, we first identify each firm's ultimate controller. We design a dummy variable that equals 1 if the
ultimate controller is an individual, and 0 if the firm is ultimately controlled by the central or a local government or government
agency. We adopt the following two approaches to investigate ownership effects. First, we partition our sample into two
subsamples based on ownership type, and then compare the coefficients between these subsamples. Second, we include an
interaction term between the group-affiliation and ownership dummies to capture the incremental effect of ownership type on
the role played by business groups.
Developments in the financial market play a role in reducing the cost of external financing and in reducing asymmetric
information problems. We expect that financial market development will reduce the disparity between the costs of external and
internal financing and thereby mitigate financial constraints. Laeven (2003) finds that financial liberalization relaxes financing
constraints on firms, especially small ones, while Love (2003) provides evidence that financial development influences growth by
reducing financial constraints. One important feature of the Chinese economy is that decentralization has led to great
heterogeneity across localities in terms of the level of market development and institutional quality. Based on this, we propose the
following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 5. The role played by business groups in China as internal capital markets and in risk sharing and firm performance is
more significant among firms that are located in regions or provinces with a lower level of market development than among those
located in regions or provinces with a higher level of market development.
To determine whether the effects of business groups differ under different market environments, we use an index of market
intermediaries and legal environment. The index covers the development score for each province and major municipality (Fan
and Wang, 2001). Compiled by China's National Economic Research Institute (NERI), it includes a number of subindexes of the
percentages of lawyers and certified public accountants to the total population, market order, legal enforcement efficiency,
intellectual property rights protection, and consumer rights protection. We partition the sample into two groups based on the
index, one below and the other above the median. We run regressions for each specification using the two subsamples to test
Hypothesis 5.
4. Data sources and sample selection
4.1. Group identiﬁcation
Our sample includes all firms listed on either the Shanghai or the Shenzhen Stock Exchange. The information on each firm's
group affiliation is from an annual survey conducted by the China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC). The survey covers
the period from the beginning of the Chinese capital market to 2006. It is to some extent a mandatory or administrative
requirement for listed firms to report their group affiliation information to the CSRC, including ownership structure, ultimate
controlling shareholder, and other related listed firms within the same group. Unfortunately, we have no access to the dataset
after 2006.
Based on the dataset from the CSRC, we identify a firm's group-affiliation in each year if its ultimate controlling entity had
more than one firm in that year. Therefore, we can identify each firm's group affiliation and the affiliation and disaffiliation years.
Thus, we have the full picture of a specific group's evolution.
Because comprehensive cash flow information of Chinese listed firms is available from 1998 onward, we restrict our sample
period to begin in 1998, even though we have group information that year before.
Table 1, together with Figs. 2 and 3, illustrates the distribution of the business groups and affiliated listed firms over time.
Column 2 in Panel A shows that the number of groups increased from 41 in 1998 to 141 in 2006. Of the 100 new groups created in
nine years, most formed after 2000. The average number of firms in each group is slightly more than three, as shown in column 3,
and the median numbers given in column 4 show that most groups have three listed firms each year. In our group sample, the
smallest groups have at least two listed firms, while the number of affiliated listed firms for the largest groups varies from 11 in
1998 to 14 in 2006. We count the numbers of group-affiliated and unaffiliated firms and report the numbers of newly affiliated
and disaffiliated firms each year in Panel B. For example, in 1998, there were 931 listed firms on the Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock
Exchange, of which 778 were classified as stand-alone firms and 153 as group-affiliated ones. Among them, five firms are added in
that year. From column 4, we find that most group-affiliated firms joined a business group between 2000 and 2005. Column 5
shows that group-affiliated firms were less likely to become disaffiliated from a group in the early years. In 2002, three
group-affiliated firms disaffiliated from their groups, and seven to eight firms did so in each of the following three years. This
number more than doubled to 19 in 2006. This may explain to some extent why the average number of firms in each group
dropped in 2006, as shown in Fig. 2. More intuitively, Fig. 3 shows the proportion of group-affiliated versus unaffiliated firms over
time. The proportion of group-affiliated firms grew continuously from more than 15% in 1998 to more than 30% in 2005 and
Table 1
Basic statistics of the business groups and the affiliated listed firms. This table shows the basic statistics of the business groups and the affiliated listed firms in our
sample from 1998 to 2006. In Panel A, we count the number of existent groups in each year and report the average, median, minimum, and maximum numbers of
affiliated firms each year. In Panel B, we compare the number of group- versus non-group-affiliated firms, as well as the number of firms that join and leave the
groups each year.
Panel A: Business group information in each year
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6]
Year No. of groups Avg no. of firms Median no. of firm Min no. of firms Max no. of firms
1998 41 3.4634 3 2 11
1999 42 3.7381 3 2 12
2000 51 3.6863 3 2 12
2001 67 3.7164 3 2 13
2002 80 3.7625 3 2 14
2003 99 3.6768 3 2 14
2004 113 3.6903 3 2 14
2005 124 3.6935 3 2 14
2006 141 3.4894 3 2 14
Total 141 3.4894 3 2 14
Panel B: Number of group- versus non-group-affiliated firms in each year
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6]
Year Non-group-affiliated Group-affiliated Initiation Exit Total
1998 778 153 5 . 931
1999 848 183 19 . 1031
2000 934 240 35 . 1174
2001 964 289 35 . 1253
2002 968 350 50 3 1318
2003 973 404 48 7 1377
2004 1028 445 38 7 1473
2005 997 478 38 8 1475
2006 1047 479 19 19 1526
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some firms disaffiliating from their groups.
4.2. Financial information
We get all financial information from the GTA Research Service Centre. The definition and calculation of each variable have
been discussed in Section 3. Here we illustrate how to construct Tobin's Q. The traditional definition of Tobin's Q is the ratio of a
firm's market value to book value. However, some shares were not tradable in China before 2006. Even though these shares had
nominal market prices, like other trading shares, they were not tradable in the market. To address this issue, we calculate a firm's
market value by summing up the following three components: the market value of the trading shares, the book value of the
non-trading shares,11 and the book value of the firm's total liability. We divide the sum by the firm's total assets to proxy the
firm's Tobin's Q. In addition, some firms in our sample have H-shares listed on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange. These should be
included when calculating a firm's market value. We get the market value of H-share stock from the Thomson Financial database.
4.3. Ownership dummy and proxy for institutional factors
We construct a firm ownership dummy by identifying the ultimate controlling shareholder. The dummy variable equals 1 if
the controlling party is an individual person, employee shareholder, foreign company, or collective enterprise, and 0 if the
controlling shareholder is the central or a local government, or a central or local State Assets Supervision and Administration
Commission (SASAC).
As noted in Section 3, we use the m-index developed by Fan andWang (2001) to construct an institutional dummy. We partition
our sample into two groups: onewith a higher-than-medianm-index (highm-index region) and the otherwith a lower-than-median
m-index (lowm-index region). If a firm's headquarters is located in a highm-index region, then the firm's institutional dummy takes
a value of 1; if it is located in a low m-index region, then the firm's institutional dummy takes a value of 0.
As reported in Table 1, the numbers of listed firms in China's stock market, both stand-alone and group-affiliated, are
increasing due to new IPOs over time. There were 1526 listed firms by the end of 2006. Our main empirical design is panel data
regression. We want to keep our panel data structure balanced. In other words, for each firm in our sample, there should be nine11 We ﬁrst calculate the proportion of a ﬁrm's non-trading shares of its total shares, and then we apply that ratio to the ﬁrm's total book equity value (net asset
value) to get the estimated book value of the non-trading shares.
Fig. 2. Number of groups and average number of firms in each group.
Fig. 3. Proportion of group-affiliated and non-group-affiliated firms.
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we delete 4 financial firms, 927 firms are left. In addition, because many firms are listed in both A- and B-share markets, our basic
sample has double-counted them, with 784 firms left after consolidation. Finally, we delete those firms with missing observations.
Thus, our final sample size includes 629 non-financial firms with 9 annual observations from 1998 to 2006. In our ownership and
market development tests, the sample sizes change slightly according to the data availability of ownership and market
development.12 We use fixed-effects OLS with a year dummy for the following empirical analysis.
Table 2 shows the descriptive statistics. Panel A summarizes the key variables of the group-affiliated and unaffiliated firms in
each year, including investment, cash flow, Tobin's Q, cash holdings, sales, and leverage.We find that some variables have a higher
standard deviation in some years than in others. This could be caused by outliers. Therefore, we calculate the median and perform
the median difference test when we compare those variables between the group-affiliated and unaffiliated firms. The results are
shown in Panel B. We find that group-affiliated firms have a higher degree of investment, cash flow, cash holding, sales, and
leverage and a lower Tobin's Q than unaffiliated ones. However, the significance of the relation varies from year to year. We report
the correlation results in Panel C. First, we investigate the correlation between investment and Tobin's Q (lagged). They are
positively correlated as documented in the prior literature, and the year-by-year analysis shows that the correlation is marginally
significant. We are more interested in the difference in the correlation of investment with cash flow between the group-affiliated
and unaffiliated firms. However, the result is not stable. Group-affiliated firms generally show a more positive correlation
between investment and cash flow than unaffiliated firms do; however, year-by-year analysis shows that from 1998 to 2001 and
in 2004, the investment of group affiliates is less positively correlated with their cash flow. This suggests that it is critical to
include other control variables and the time effect in the following regression analysis.
5. Empirical results
5.1. Business groups and ﬁnancial constraints
Table 3 shows the results for the baseline estimation for Hypothesis 1. We first run several regressions using the whole sample
and subsamples without any interaction term. The results are shown in Panel A. Columns 1 to 4 report the investment–cash flow12 The main test sample is for ﬁnancial constraint regression. For other test samples, the number of ﬁrms may vary as some ﬁrm ownership structure or
institutional factors are missing, or other ﬁnancial items used in one speciﬁc regression (e.g., the performance test) are missing.
Table 2
Descriptive statistics. This table presents the descriptive statistics of several key variables of the group- and non-group-affiliated firms in each year from 1998 to 2006. Investment and Cash Flow are scaled by
beginning-of-period capital stock, Cash Holding and Sales are scaled by beginning-of-period total assets, Tobin's Q is measured as the market-to-book ratio, and Leverage is measured as the total liabilities-to-total assets
ratio. Panel A presents the observation number, mean, median, and standard deviation of each variable. Panel B lists the median difference between the group- and non-group-affiliated firms in each year, as well as the
p-values. Panel C analyzes the correlation between Investment and lagged Tobin's Q, and Investment and Cash Flow for the group- and non-group-affiliated samples.
Panel A: Basic statistics
Investment Cash flow Tobin's Q Cash holding Sales Leverage
Year N Mean Median Std dev Mean Median Std dev Mean Median Std dev Mean Median Std dev Mean Median Std dev Mean Median Std dev
Non-group-affiliated
1998 527 0.4774 0.1720 0.9212 0.8082 0.3754 3.8491 1.5245 1.4463 0.4104 0.1211 0.0873 0.1201 0.6287 0.4750 0.5696 0.4164 0.4119 0.1773
1999 515 0.3358 0.1031 0.9074 0.5614 0.2917 2.9262 1.6397 1.5130 0.5957 0.1363 0.1056 0.1305 0.5702 0.4579 0.4544 0.4343 0.4139 0.2118
2000 487 0.4100 0.1180 2.9701 0.6434 0.2599 4.9846 2.0744 1.9057 0.7740 0.1749 0.1223 0.1846 0.6223 0.4670 0.6495 0.4566 0.4355 0.2341
2001 467 0.3336 0.1351 0.8647 0.4093 0.2108 2.6224 1.7843 1.6104 0.6851 0.1682 0.1324 0.1392 0.5581 0.4459 0.4916 0.4953 0.4589 0.3951
2002 436 0.3501 0.1418 1.4027 0.2945 0.1893 3.0203 1.5573 1.3719 0.5744 0.1523 0.1185 0.1283 0.5838 0.4586 0.5816 0.5088 0.5007 0.2662
2003 412 0.2806 0.1698 0.4352 0.3492 0.1881 1.7901 1.3794 1.2577 0.4367 0.1561 0.1260 0.1534 0.6661 0.4763 0.7092 0.5415 0.5247 0.3089
2004 395 0.2838 0.1216 0.9320 0.4423 0.1880 1.7454 1.2666 1.1598 0.5245 0.1355 0.1052 0.1156 0.6705 0.5260 0.5645 0.5928 0.5444 0.8413
2005 378 0.2619 0.1163 0.7749 0.3056 0.1657 1.4085 1.1922 1.0883 0.5662 0.1226 0.0932 0.1251 0.6642 0.5033 0.6069 0.6562 0.5784 0.9060
2006 377 0.5488 0.1152 4.3085 0.4261 0.1902 1.8992 1.5518 1.2596 2.9650 0.1360 0.1001 0.1837 0.7202 0.5281 0.6929 0.6330 0.5726 0.6147
All 3994 0.3671 0.1310 1.8737 0.4864 0.2228 3.0099 1.5710 1.3804 1.0955 0.1451 0.1088 0.1450 0.6272 0.4742 0.5928 0.5164 0.4861 0.4917
Group-affiliated
1998 102 0.3968 0.1833 0.5922 1.2492 0.3672 7.1218 1.4126 1.2494 0.5466 0.1822 0.1262 0.1885 0.6897 0.5633 0.5421 0.4287 0.4309 0.1713
1999 114 0.2810 0.1549 0.4526 1.9742 0.3175 15.2969 1.4739 1.3403 0.6433 0.1664 0.1449 0.1126 0.6206 0.5720 0.3476 0.4580 0.4694 0.1787
2000 142 0.5490 0.1397 2.3660 1.7546 0.3135 12.8001 1.9817 1.7651 0.9382 0.1941 0.1483 0.1738 0.6146 0.5426 0.3792 0.4690 0.4718 0.1778
2001 162 0.3260 0.1806 0.5968 0.5444 0.2388 1.5680 1.7677 1.5815 0.6874 0.2096 0.1622 0.1687 0.6464 0.5272 0.5746 0.5041 0.4959 0.3616
2002 193 0.3804 0.1717 1.0531 0.5102 0.2560 1.5890 1.5517 1.3700 0.5420 0.1919 0.1636 0.1382 0.7404 0.5806 0.6156 0.5273 0.4903 0.4027
2003 217 0.2985 0.1746 0.4209 0.2900 0.2532 0.9451 1.3750 1.2615 0.4194 0.1903 0.1484 0.1382 0.7832 0.6290 0.6096 0.5294 0.5119 0.3469
2004 234 0.2665 0.1715 0.3505 0.4869 0.2057 1.8368 1.2330 1.1626 0.3318 0.1618 0.1436 0.1109 0.8322 0.6577 0.7843 0.5508 0.5355 0.3495
2005 251 0.2586 0.1155 0.9414 0.5699 0.1691 2.9223 1.1636 1.0882 0.3507 0.1520 0.1201 0.1267 0.8550 0.6238 1.1411 0.5861 0.5576 0.4665
2006 252 0.3032 0.1038 1.7597 0.5981 0.1885 2.0516 8.3506 1.2750 109.4605 0.1559 0.1182 0.1539 0.8753 0.6758 0.9119 4.1210 0.5657 55.2263
All 1667 0.3270 0.1494 1.1477 0.7552 0.2336 6.0087 2.4971 1.2776 42.5625 0.1756 0.1409 0.1452 0.7653 0.6081 0.7599 1.0650 0.5121 21.4773
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Panel B: Median difference analysis
Investment Cash flow Tobin's Q Cash holding Sales Leverage
Diff p-Value Diff p-Value Diff p-Value Diff p-Value Diff p-Value Diff p-Value
1998 −0.0113 0.9860 0.0082 0.9566 0.1969 0.0001 −0.0389 0.0003 −0.0883 0.1873 −0.0190 0.3170
1999 −0.0518 0.0546 −0.0258 0.4966 0.1727 0.0001 −0.0393 0.0006 −0.1141 0.0072 −0.0555 0.0477
2000 −0.0217 0.2510 −0.0536 0.0943 0.1406 0.0075 −0.0260 0.0126 −0.0756 0.0839 −0.0363 0.1323
2001 −0.0455 0.1945 −0.0280 0.0243 0.0289 0.3452 −0.0298 0.0006 −0.0813 0.0123 −0.0370 0.2188
2002 −0.0299 0.1691 −0.0667 0.0001 0.0019 0.6789 −0.0451 0.0000 −0.1220 0.0001 0.0104 0.9520
2003 −0.0048 0.2868 −0.0651 0.0375 −0.0038 0.8897 −0.0224 0.0001 −0.1527 0.0001 0.0128 0.3767
2004 −0.0499 0.0327 −0.0177 0.2911 −0.0028 0.5419 −0.0384 0.0003 −0.1317 0.0005 0.0089 0.8158
2005 0.0008 0.5907 −0.0034 0.4694 0.0001 0.8132 −0.0269 0.0016 −0.1205 0.0002 0.0208 0.1210
2006 0.0114 0.4764 0.0017 0.2115 −0.0154 0.3897 −0.0181 0.0167 −0.1477 0.0004 0.0069 0.4977
All −0.0184 0.02821 −0.0108 0.1055 0.1028 b0.0001 −0.0321 b0.0001 −0.1339 b0.0001 −0.0260 b0.0001
Panel C: Correlation analysis
Investment vs. Tobin's Q (lagged) Investment vs. cash flow
Non-group-affiliated Group-affiliated
N Corr p-Value N Corr p-Value N Corr p-Value
1998 . . . 527 0.3314 b .0001 102 −0.0094 0.9256
1999 629 0.2571 b .0001 515 0.6310 b .0001 114 0.1396 0.1385
2000 629 0.0738 0.0643 487 0.9605 b .0001 142 0.9428 b .0001
2001 629 0.0672 0.0924 467 0.3824 b .0001 162 0.2467 0.0016
2002 629 0.0116 0.7709 436 0.4018 b .0001 193 0.6791 b .0001
2003 629 −0.0065 0.8712 412 −0.0939 0.0560 217 −0.2292 0.0007
2004 629 0.0288 0.4702 395 0.1845 0.0002 234 0.1068 0.103
2005 629 0.0093 0.8165 378 0.1749 0.0006 251 0.7010 b .0001
2006 629 −0.0062 0.8763 377 0.2440 b .0001 252 0.6165 b .0001
All 5661 0.0309 0.0282 3994 0.4653 b .0001 1667 0.4753 b .0001
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178 J. He et al. / Journal of Corporate Finance 22 (2013) 166–192sensitivity for the full sample. Then we conduct a similar estimation for the group-affiliated and unaffiliated subsamples, as shown
in columns 5 to 12, respectively. We find that the group-affiliated firms have a significantly lower level of investment–cash flow
sensitivity (around 0.12) than the unaffiliated ones (around 0.44), which implies that group affiliates face fewer financial
constraints than unaffiliated firms. Then we introduce an interaction term between cash flow and group dummy into the
regression as in specification (1). The interaction term coefficients in both columns 2 and 3 of Panel B (without and with cash
holding, sales, and leverage as the control variables) are negative and statistically significant, being consistent with the findings in
Panel A. Therefore, business groups in China do indeed serve as internal capital markets and play a very important role in
mitigating the financial constraints faced by member firms.
We then examine the impact of ownership type on the role of internal capital market played by business groups. In Panel A in
Table 4, we look at all group-affiliated firms13 and then separate them into state-owned and private ones. As shown in columns 1
and 2, the state-owned group affiliates face fewer financial constraints than the private group firms do. Their investment–cash
flow sensitivities are 0.11 and 0.37, respectively. We then separate the unaffiliated from the affiliated firms in each category. A
comparison of columns 3 and 4 reveals that if a private firm is affiliated with a group, then it has a higher level of investment–cash
flow sensitivity than if it is not. It is a little surprising to find that group affiliation does not ease the financial constraints of private
firms. In contrast, among the state-owned firms, those which are group affiliated are less likely to be financially constrained than
unaffiliated ones, as shown in columns 5 and 6. The results suggest that a business group serves as an internal capital market for
state-owned affiliated firms. However, the single subsample comparison may not be able to directly capture the effect of
switching in group affiliation because we are using panel data. Therefore, in Panel B of Table 4, we add two interaction terms to
the basic regression specification in Panel A. The coefficient of the interaction term between cash flow and group dummy is
significantly negative, whereas the coefficient of the three-way interaction among cash flow, group dummy, and ownership
dummy (1 if private) is significantly negative. We interpret the result to mean that if a firm is a group affiliate, then its investment
will be less sensitive to its cash flow. However, the role of internal capital market played by a business group is more pronounced
among private business groups, which is consistent with Hypothesis 4. In order to distinguish the different roles played by
business group in central and local government SOEs, we further construct two dummies for central and local government SOEs,
respectively. The comparison of coefficients for three-way interaction among cash flow, group dummy, and central/local
government ownership dummies (columns 3 and 4) reveals that the role of internal capital market played by a business group is
more significant for the firms owned by local governments. In column 5, we run the regression in the state-owned subsample, and
the coefficient of the three-way interaction among cash flow, group dummy, and central government ownership dummy has the
expected signs, though it is not statistically significant.
In Table 5, we see how institutional factors shape the role of internal capital market played by a business group. Again, we first
separate all group-affiliated firms into two subsamples: firms in regions with a lower level of market development (average
m-index from 1999 to 2002 is below the median level), and firms in regions with a higher level of market development (average
m-index from 1999 to 2002 is above the median level). In columns 1 and 2, the results show that the level of investment–cash
flow sensitivity is lower among group-affiliated firms located in regions with a higher level of market development (0.11 versus
0.38). Then we divide all firms into two groups based on the m-index and further partition each into group-affiliated and
unaffiliated subsamples. We find that among firms in regions with a low level of market development, group affiliates face more
financial constraints (investment–cash flow sensitivity = 0.64), whereas among firms in regions with a higher level of market
development, group affiliates face fewer financial constraints (investment–cash flow sensitivity = 0.12). We then include an
interaction term among cash flow, group dummy, and m-index dummy (1 if the m-index is above the median level) in Panel B.
The coefficients of the interaction term are both negative but not statistically significant, as shown in column 2. A group affiliate in
a highly developed region tends to have fewer financial constraints than one in a poorly developed region. This finding is not
consistent with Hypothesis 5. That is, business groups in China do not make up for an underdeveloped institutional environment,
as suggested by Khanna and Palepu (2000b). La Porta et al. (1999) and Morck et al. (2005) argue that tunneling among group
members in a pyramid structure can allow one firm to be propped up at the expense of other “weak” members in the group. A
poor institutional environment not only makes external capital markets inefficient but it can also discount the role of business
groups as internal capital markets. Although business groups can bring greater financial freedom to member firms in a weak
institutional environment, the degree of such freedom is limited by the poor environment. This finding indicates that developed
institutions are necessary for the operational efficiency of internal capital markets.5.2. Business groups and risk sharing
We investigate the risk-sharing role of business groups by estimating specifications (2) and (3), which are discussed in
Section 3. The dependent variable of regression (2) is profit volatility (StdOp), which is measured as the standard deviation of a
firm's yearly operating profit over the sample period. We also include control variables profit (Op), size (Size), and industry
dummies. Profit is defined as the average yearly operating profit over the sample period. Size is defined as the average yearly total
assets over the same period from 1998 to 2006. In contrast to the other specifications, it is a cross-sectional rather than a panel
structure. However, as described in Section 3, we identify a group dummy for each firm year. Some firms are group affiliated for
the whole sample period from 1998 to 2006, whereas others are affiliated only for certain years over the sample period. Therefore,13 All group-afﬁliated ﬁrms include ﬁrms that were in a business group for at least one year between 1998 and 2006.
Table 3
Business groups and financial constraints. This table shows the role of internal capital market as played by a business group. The sample period is from 1998 to
2006. The dependent variable is Investment, scaled by beginning-of-period capital stock. Cash Flow is scaled by beginning-of-period capital stock, Cash Holding
and Sales are scaled by beginning-of-period total assets, Leverage is measured as the total liabilities-to-total assets ratio, and Tobin's Q is measured as the
market-to-book ratio (we use its lagged value in the regression). Panel A reports the results of the fixed-effects OLS model for the whole sample and subsamples.
Columns 1 to 4 show the results for the whole sample, columns 5 to 8 show those of only the stand-alone firms, and columns 9 to 12 show those of only the firms
that are affiliated with a business group. Panel B adds the interaction term between Cash Flow and the business group dummy. Standard errors are in parentheses
and values significantly different from zero at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels are marked with ⁎, ⁎⁎, and ⁎⁎⁎, respectively.
Panel A: Subsample comparison
All Sample Non-group-affiliated Group-affiliated
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] [11] [12]
Tobin's Q 0.1212⁎ 0.1034⁎ 0.1273⁎⁎ 0.1072 0.2227⁎⁎ 0.2255⁎⁎ 0.1402⁎⁎ 0.0831⁎ 0.0940⁎
(0.062) (0.058) (0.063) (0.101) (0.088) (0.103) (0.056) (0.050) (0.050)
Cash flow 0.1707⁎⁎⁎ 0.1708⁎⁎⁎ 0.1674⁎⁎⁎ 0.4185⁎⁎⁎ 0.4208⁎⁎⁎ 0.4172⁎⁎⁎ 0.0604⁎⁎⁎ 0.0601⁎⁎⁎ 0.0585⁎⁎⁎
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
Cash flow
(−1)
0.0289⁎⁎⁎ 0.0286⁎⁎⁎ 0.0279⁎⁎⁎ 0.0231 0.0218 0.0205 0.0610⁎⁎⁎ 0.0608⁎⁎⁎ 0.0606⁎⁎⁎
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.016) (0.016) (0.015) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
Cash
holding
1.3590⁎⁎⁎ 2.0882⁎⁎⁎ 0.5678⁎⁎⁎
(0.214) (0.331) (0.182)
Sales −0.1358⁎⁎ −0.3058⁎⁎ −0.0551
(0.063) (0.122) (0.044)
Leverage −0.0663 −0.0301 −0.0528
(0.078) (0.104) (0.105)
Time effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of
stock
629 629 629 629 354 354 354 354 275 275 275 275
R-square 0.00259 0.181 0.182 0.188 0.00228 0.270 0.273 0.281 0.00710 0.266 0.268 0.274
Panel B: Interaction analysis
[1] [2] [3]
Cash flow 0.2720⁎⁎⁎ 0.2722⁎⁎⁎ 0.2689⁎⁎⁎
(0.010) (0.010) (0.010)
Cash flow (−1) 0.1171⁎⁎⁎ 0.1168⁎⁎⁎ 0.1161⁎⁎⁎
(0.009) (0.009) (0.009)
(Cash flow + cash flow (−1)) ∗ BG −0.1313⁎⁎⁎ −0.1315⁎⁎⁎ −0.1314⁎⁎⁎
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008)
Tobin's Q 0.1114⁎⁎ 0.1231⁎⁎
(0.056) (0.061)
Cash holding 1.3533⁎⁎⁎
(0.208)
Sales −0.1600⁎⁎⁎
(0.061)
Leverage −0.0276
(0.076)
Time effect Yes Yes Yes
Number of stock 629 629 629
R-square 0.230 0.232 0.238
179J. He et al. / Journal of Corporate Finance 22 (2013) 166–192we introduce three types of group dummies to distinguish them. The first dummy variable is BG_1, which equals 1 if a firm is in a
group throughout the whole sample period; that is, nine years, and 0 otherwise. The second one is BG_2, which equals 1 if a firm
stays in a group for less than nine years, and 0 otherwise. We use BG to denote group affiliation in general, which equals 1 once
the firm has been in a group, and 0 otherwise; that is, BG includes both BG_1 and BG_2. The estimation is conducted by OLS
weighted by the number of observations of each firm in calculating its average financial items and profit volatility.
Panel A in Table 6 presents the estimation results. Column 1 shows that although the coefficient of BG is positive, it is not
statistically significant. However, in column 2, we can see that the effect of BG_1 is significantly negative, which means that a firm
that is group affiliated throughout the whole sample period has a lower level of profit volatility, ceteris paribus. Group affiliation
has a negative effect on the standard deviation of operating profitability. When using the group dummy BG_1, we find a
significantly positive coefficient. If BG_2 takes a value of 1, then a firm has experienced a switch from being group affiliated to
unaffiliated or vice versa. Regime switching itself could result in a higher level of profit volatility.
Panel B shows the estimation results of the above regressions using the state-owned and private subsamples. The coefficient of
BG is not significant for state-owned firms, whereas it is significantly positive for private ones. We then partition BG into BG_1 and
BG_2. The coefficient of BG_1 is significantly negative for both state-owned and private firms, and the magnitude is relatively
higher for private ones. If we use BG_2 as the group dummy, then the effects are significantly positive for both state-owned and
private firms. We conclude that the role of business groups in reducing profit volatility is more pronounced among private group
affiliates, which supports Hypothesis 4. This could be because maintaining listing status is more valuable among private firms. The
Table 4
Business groups, financial constraints, and ownership type. This table shows the effect of ownership type on the role of internal capital market as played by a
business group. The sample period is from 1998 to 2006. The dependent variable is Investment, scaled by beginning-of-period capital stock. Cash Flow is scaled by
beginning-of-period capital stock, Cash Holding and Sales are scaled by beginning-of-period total assets, Leverage is measured as the total liabilities-to-total
assets ratio, and Tobin's Q is measured as the market-to-book ratio (we use its lagged value in the regression). Panel A reports the results of the comparison of the
fixed-effects OLS model for the different subsamples. In columns 1 and 2, we divide all group-affiliated firms into state-owned and private. In columns 3 and 4, we
divide all private firms into non-group and group examples. In columns 5 and 6, we divide all state-owned firms into non-group and group examples. Panel B
shows the results of the interaction analysis. We construct an ownership dummy that takes a value of 1 if a firm is private, and 0 otherwise. This then interacts
with Cash Flow and the business group dummy (column 2). We also construct central and local government ownership-type dummies, respectively, to
distinguish the different roles played by business groups in local and central SOEs in columns 3 to 5, with column 5 using only the SOE subsample. Standard errors
are in parentheses and values significantly different from zero at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels are marked with ⁎, ⁎⁎, and ⁎⁎⁎, respectively.
Panel A: Subsample comparison
All group-affiliated Private State-owned
State-owned Private Non-group Group Non-group Group
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6]
Cash flow 0.0618⁎⁎⁎ 0.1523⁎⁎⁎ 0.0314⁎⁎ 0.0485⁎⁎⁎ 0.5086⁎⁎⁎ 0.3053⁎⁎⁎
(0.005) (0.033) (0.015) (0.014) (0.019) (0.012)
Cash flow (−1) 0.0478⁎⁎⁎ 0.2215⁎⁎⁎ 0.0330⁎⁎ 0.0719⁎⁎⁎ −0.0347⁎⁎ 0.0437⁎⁎⁎
(0.005) (0.024) (0.014) (0.014) (0.018) (0.012)
Tobin's Q 0.1136⁎⁎ 0.0189 0.1651⁎⁎ −0.0523 −0.1536 0.0454
(0.050) (0.148) (0.076) (0.370) (0.128) (0.039)
Cash holding 0.5782⁎⁎⁎ 0.3632 1.2408⁎⁎⁎ −0.6339 2.3279⁎⁎⁎ 0.8622⁎⁎⁎
(0.184) (0.531) (0.272) (1.138) (0.386) (0.145)
Sales −0.0332 −0.0126 −0.0118 0.2374 −0.2192⁎ −0.0501
(0.040) (0.225) (0.113) (0.593) (0.117) (0.042)
Leverage −0.1111 0.1602 −0.0766 0.1395 −0.6426⁎ −0.1437⁎⁎
(0.103) (0.325) (0.062) (0.747) (0.331) (0.073)
Time effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of stock 193 64 157 65 350 197
R-square 0.353 0.302 0.0487 0.344 0.316 0.345
Panel B: Interaction analysis
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5]
Cash flow 0.2689⁎⁎⁎ 0.2609⁎⁎⁎ 0.2589⁎⁎⁎ 0.2596⁎⁎⁎ 0.4840⁎⁎⁎
(0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.015)
Cash flow (−1) 0.1161⁎⁎⁎ 0.1244⁎⁎⁎ 0.1231⁎⁎⁎ 0.1238⁎⁎⁎ −0.0150
(0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.013)
(Cash flow + cash flow (−1)) ∗ BG −0.1314⁎⁎⁎ −0.0403⁎ −0.1335⁎⁎⁎ −0.1319⁎⁎⁎ −0.0993⁎⁎⁎
(0.008) (0.021) (0.008) (0.008) (0.031)
(Cash flow + cash flow (−1)) ∗ BG⁎ dummy (1 = private) −0.0961⁎⁎⁎
(0.021)
(Cash flow + cash flow (−1)) ∗ BG⁎ dummy (1 = central govt.) 0.1264⁎⁎⁎ 0.0536
(0.027) (0.040)
(Cash flow + cash flow (−1)) ∗ BG⁎ dummy (1 = local govt.) 0.0516⁎
(0.031)
Tobin's Q 0.1231⁎⁎ 0.0879 0.0945 0.0988 −0.0412
(0.061) (0.062) (0.062) (0.062) (0.076)
Cash holding 1.3533⁎⁎⁎ 1.4630⁎⁎⁎ 1.4643⁎⁎⁎ 1.4806⁎⁎⁎ 1.8542⁎⁎⁎
(0.208) (0.212) (0.212) (0.212) (0.252)
Sales −0.1600⁎⁎⁎ −0.1570⁎⁎⁎ −0.1565⁎⁎ −0.1576⁎⁎⁎ −0.1334⁎⁎
(0.061) (0.061) (0.061) (0.061) (0.066)
Leverage −0.0276 −0.0062 −0.0108 −0.0118 −0.2458
(0.076) (0.075) (0.075) (0.076) (0.167)
Time effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of stock 629 605 605 605 437
R-square 0.238 0.239 0.241 0.236 0.314
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BG_1 and private/central and local government owned dummies, respectively. The result is consistent with our expectation that
the role of business groups in reducing profit volatility is more pronounced among private group affiliates, as well as among local
government owned ones relative to central government owned ones.
Panel C shows how institutional factors shape the role of business groups in reducing profit volatility. The coefficient of BG_1 is
significantly negative for firms located in low m-index regions, whereas it is negative but insignificant for firms in high m-index
regions. This implies that the role of business group affiliation in reducing profit volatility is more pronounced in regions or
provinces with a lower level of market or institutional development. This finding is consistent with Hypothesis 5. For group
dummy BG_2, which is more likely to proxy group affiliation switching, the effects are significantly positive in both subsamples.
The interaction analysis in column 7 also confirms the above finding.
Table 5
Business groups, financial constraints, and level of market development. This table shows the effect of the level of market development on the role of internal
capital market played by a business group. The sample period is from 1998 to 2006. We use the m-index as the benchmark (high if above median level and low if
below median level). The dependent variable is Investment, scaled by beginning-of-period capital stock. Cash Flow is scaled by beginning-of-period capital stock,
Cash Holding and Sales are scaled by beginning-of-period total assets, Leverage is measured as the total liabilities-to-total assets ratio, and Tobin's Q is measured
as the market-to-book ratio (we use its lagged value in the regression). Panel A reports the comparison of the fixed-effects OLS model for the different
subsamples. In columns 1 and 2, we divide all group-affiliated firms into firms in low- and high-level market development regions, respectively. In columns 3 and
4, we divide all firms from low-level market development regions into non-group and group examples, respectively. In columns 5 and 6, we divide all firms from
high-level market development regions into non-group and group examples, respectively. Panel B shows the results of the interaction analysis. We construct an
ownership dummy that takes a value of 1 if a firm is located in a high-level market development region, and 0 otherwise. This then interacts with Cash Flow and
the business group dummy. Standard errors are in parentheses and values significantly different from zero at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels are marked with ⁎, ⁎⁎, and
⁎⁎⁎, respectively.
Panel A: Subsample comparison
All group-affiliated Low m-index High m-index
Low High Non-group Group Non-group Group
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6]
Cash flow 0.0413 0.0591⁎⁎⁎ 0.1334⁎⁎⁎ 0.5319⁎⁎⁎ 0.3965⁎⁎⁎ 0.0583⁎⁎⁎
(0.073) (0.006) (0.029) (0.129) (0.018) (0.007)
Cash flow (−1) 0.3376⁎⁎⁎ 0.0602⁎⁎⁎ 0.0025 0.1060 0.0144 0.0628⁎⁎⁎
(0.075) (0.006) (0.012) (0.106) (0.017) (0.007)
Tobin's Q 0.2088⁎⁎ 0.0650 0.1980⁎⁎⁎ 0.0229 0.2390⁎⁎ 0.0593
(0.089) (0.059) (0.062) (0.090) (0.119) (0.088)
Cash holding 0.4526⁎ 0.5277⁎⁎ 0.4584⁎⁎ 0.2015 2.3085⁎⁎⁎ 0.5749⁎
(0.274) (0.219) (0.196) (0.254) (0.396) (0.321)
Sales 0.0432 −0.0729 0.0099 −0.0754 −0.2750⁎⁎ −0.1086
(0.103) (0.050) (0.067) (0.097) (0.130) (0.099)
Leverage 0.1251 −0.0320 −0.1307⁎⁎ −0.1476 −0.0132 −0.0517
(0.230) (0.121) (0.063) (0.255) (0.129) (0.162)
Time effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of stock 54 212 132 54 359 212
R-square 0.159 0.288 0.0602 0.0456 0.271 0.303
Panel B: Interaction analysis
[1] [2]
Cash flow 0.2688⁎⁎⁎ 0.2688⁎⁎⁎
(0.010) (0.010)
Cash flow (−1) 0.1162⁎⁎⁎ 0.1162⁎⁎⁎
(0.010) (0.010)
(Cash flow + cash flow (−1)) ∗ BG −0.1315⁎⁎⁎ −0.1158
(0.009) (0.117)
(Cash flow + cash flow (−1)) ∗ BG⁎ dummy (high m-index) −0.0157
(0.117)
Tobin's Q 0.1288⁎⁎ 0.1286⁎⁎
(0.064) (0.064)
Cash holding 1.4047⁎⁎⁎ 1.4044⁎⁎⁎
(0.219) (0.219)
Sales −0.1664⁎⁎⁎ −0.1666⁎⁎⁎
(0.064) (0.064)
Leverage −0.0309 −0.0307
(0.078) (0.078)
Time effect Yes Yes
Number of stock 592 592
R-square 0.238 0.238
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model (3) are shown in Table 7. For the whole sample regression, group affiliation reduces the likelihood of bankruptcy or
financial distress significantly (with a coefficient of around −0.30) after we control for other financial measures and time and
industry effects. For the subsamples of ownership type and market development, although the coefficients are still negative, they
are not statistically significant. For the interaction analysis, we do not find any statistically significant result.
5.3. Business groups and ﬁrm performance
We investigate the relationship between business group affiliation and firm performance based on specification (4) and report
the results in Table 8. We use ROA as the performance measure in Panel A. Generally, the group dummy coefficients in either the
whole sample or subsample regressions are not statistically significant, except for the low m-index subsample (with a significant
coefficient of around 0.02). This suggests that being affiliated with a group tends to enhance a firm's ROA in a less developed
Table 6
Business groups and profit volatility. This table presents the results of the relation between group affiliation and volatility of operating profitability. We adopt
weighted OLS regression where the number of observations per firm is used as the weight. The dependent variable is the standard deviation of each firm's yearly
operating profit in the sample period from 1998 to 2006. Explanatory variables include profit (Op), defined as the average yearly operating profit over the sample
period, size (Size), defined as the average yearly total asset over the sample period, and a business group dummy. We adopt three distinct group dummies: BG
with a value of 1 once the firm is in a group, and 0 otherwise; BG_1 with a value of 1 if a firm is in a group for the whole sample period (nine years), and 0
otherwise; and BG_2 with a value of 1 if a firm stays in a group for less than nine years, and 0 otherwise. Panel A shows the basic results. In Panel B, we show the
regression results for the different ownership subsamples (columns 1 to 6), as well as the interaction analysis (columns 7 to 10), and in Panel C, we show the
regression results for the different market development subsamples (columns 1 to 6), as well as the interaction analysis (column 7). Standard errors are in
parentheses and values significantly different from zero at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels are marked with ⁎, ⁎⁎, and ⁎⁎⁎, respectively.
Panel A: Interaction analysis
[1] [2] [3]
Op 0.4817⁎⁎⁎ 0.4825⁎⁎⁎ 0.4820⁎⁎⁎
(0.0024) (0.0024) (0.0024)
Size 0.2712⁎⁎⁎ 0.2819⁎⁎⁎ 0.2689⁎⁎⁎
(0.0216) (0.0216) (0.0215)
BG 0.0158
(0.0380)
BG_1 −0.2423⁎⁎⁎
(0.0565)
BG_2 0.1646⁎⁎⁎
(0.0436)
Industry effect Yes Yes Yes
Observations 10,531 10,531 10,531
R-square 0.847 0.847 0.847
Panel B: Business groups, profit volatility, and ownership type
State-owned (subsample) Private (subsample) Interaction analysis
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] [10]
Op 0.3698⁎⁎⁎ 0.3704⁎⁎⁎ 0.3703⁎⁎⁎ −0.9489⁎⁎⁎ −0.9495⁎⁎⁎ −0.9457⁎⁎⁎ 0.3347⁎⁎⁎ 0.3328⁎⁎⁎ 0.3335⁎⁎⁎ 0.3692⁎⁎⁎
(0.0063) (0.0063) (0.0063) (0.0186) (0.0186) (0.0186) (0.0058) (0.0058) (0.0058) (0.0063)
Size 0.5054⁎⁎⁎ 0.5099⁎⁎⁎ 0.5059⁎⁎⁎ 0.8799⁎⁎⁎ 0.9048⁎⁎⁎ 0.8723⁎⁎⁎ 0.4826⁎⁎⁎ 0.4917⁎⁎⁎ 0.4902⁎⁎⁎ 0.5159⁎⁎⁎
(0.0284) (0.0284) (0.0283) (0.0236) (0.0231) (0.0235) (0.0225) (0.0226) (0.0226) (0.0286)
BG 0.0301 0.1593⁎⁎⁎
(0.0450) (0.0353)
BG_1 −0.1087⁎ −0.5186⁎⁎⁎ −0.1004⁎ −0.3618⁎⁎⁎ −0.0339 −0.2251⁎⁎
(0.0591) (0.1082) (0.0553) (0.0800) (0.0666) (0.0908)
BG_2 0.1369⁎⁎ 0.2246⁎⁎⁎
(0.0546) (0.0360)
BG_1⁎ dummy
(1 = private)
−0.5787⁎⁎⁎
(0.2124)
BG_1⁎ dummy
(1 = central govt.)
0.3971⁎⁎⁎ 0.1939⁎
(0.1036) (0.1148)
BG_1⁎ dummy
(1 = local govt.)
−0.2738⁎⁎
(0.1065)
Industry effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 6966 6966 6966 2876 2876 2876 9842 9842 9842 6966
R-square 0.901 0.901 0.901 0.600 0.601 0.603 0.873 0.873 0.873 0.901
Panel C: Business groups, profit volatility, and level of market development
Low m-index High m-index Interaction analysis
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7]
Op 0.6703⁎⁎⁎ 0.6724⁎⁎⁎ 0.6709⁎⁎⁎ 0.3162⁎⁎⁎ 0.3157⁎⁎⁎ 0.3176⁎⁎⁎ 0.3369⁎⁎⁎
(0.0153) (0.0153) (0.0153) (0.0065) (0.0065) (0.0065) (0.0057)
Size −0.0373 −0.0385 −0.0373 0.5460⁎⁎⁎ 0.5636⁎⁎⁎ 0.5517⁎⁎⁎ 0.4698⁎⁎⁎
(0.0327) (0.0326) (0.0327) (0.0279) (0.0279) (0.0276) (0.0224)
BG −0.0458 0.1566⁎⁎⁎
(0.0464) (0.0467)
BG_1 −0.3499⁎⁎⁎ −0.0575 −0.6048⁎⁎⁎
(0.0750) (0.0671) (0.1070)
BG_2 0.1097⁎⁎ 0.2445⁎⁎⁎
(0.0520) (0.0537)
BG_1⁎ dummy (high m-index) 0.5741⁎⁎⁎
(0.1195)
Industry effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 2794 2794 2794 6898 6898 6898 9692
R-square 0.591 0.594 0.592 0.893 0.892 0.893 0.877
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Table 7
Business groups and bankruptcy probability. This table presents the results of the role of business group affiliation in affecting a firm's bankruptcy or financial distress probability. The sample period is from 1998 to 2006.
The dependent variable is a dummy that equals 1 if a firm is designated a special treatment or particular transfer (ST or PT) firm by the regulatory authorities in the year concerned. We run a pooled multivariate logistic
regression on a business group dummy, controlling for Net Income/Total Assets, Working Capital/Total Assets, and Market Value of Equity/Total Liabilities, as well as Industry and Time Effects. Column 1 shows the whole
sample regression results and columns 2 to 5 show the results for the state-owned, private, low level of market development region, and high level of market development region subsamples, respectively. Columns 6 to 10
presents the results for interaction analysis. Standard errors are in parentheses and values significantly different from zero at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels are marked with ⁎, ⁎⁎, and ⁎⁎⁎, respectively.
All State-owned Private Low m-index High m-index Interaction analysis
[1] [2] [3] 4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] [10]
Net income/TA −1.4572⁎⁎⁎ −3.3208⁎⁎⁎ −0.9877⁎⁎ −2.7439⁎⁎ −1.4816⁎⁎⁎ −1.6769⁎⁎⁎ −1.6949⁎⁎⁎ −1.6896⁎⁎⁎ −3.3244⁎⁎⁎ −1.5501⁎⁎⁎
(0.3910) (0.7813) (0.4441) (1.0691) (0.4481) (0.4164) (0.4172) (0.4167) (0.7819) (0.4070)
Working capital/TA −1.1939⁎⁎⁎ −1.3037⁎⁎⁎ −1.4381⁎⁎⁎ −2.0695⁎⁎⁎ −1.1212⁎⁎⁎ −1.2581⁎⁎⁎ −1.2613⁎⁎⁎ −1.2709⁎⁎⁎ −1.3176⁎⁎⁎ −1.2834⁎⁎⁎
(0.1892) (0.3592) (0.2861) (0.5094) (0.2244) (0.1946) (0.1954) (0.1951) (0.3610) (0.1973)
MV/TL −0.0807⁎⁎⁎ −0.1798⁎⁎⁎ −0.0128 −0.1167 −0.0673⁎⁎ −0.0698⁎⁎ −0.0693⁎⁎ −0.0696⁎⁎ −0.1802⁎⁎⁎ −0.0692⁎⁎
(0.0306) (0.0610) (0.0207) (0.0931) (0.0300) (0.0294) (0.0293) (0.0294) (0.0611) (0.0292)
Size −0.8346⁎⁎⁎ −0.9737⁎⁎⁎ −0.6109⁎⁎⁎ −0.7440⁎⁎⁎ −0.8971⁎⁎⁎ −0.8389⁎⁎⁎ −0.8404⁎⁎⁎ −0.8372⁎⁎⁎ −0.9714⁎⁎⁎ −0.8281⁎⁎⁎
(0.0794) (0.1199) (0.1225) (0.1833) (0.0952) (0.0828) (0.0828) (0.0828) (0.1201) (0.0826)
Leverage −0.0036 −0.3273 0.0001 −0.6917⁎ −0.0031 −0.0038 −0.0037 −0.0037 −0.3303 −0.0032
(0.0055) (0.2329) (0.0079) (0.3661) (0.0082) (0.0065) (0.0065) (0.0065) (0.2328) (0.0065)
BG −0.3004⁎ −0.1874 −0.4019 −0.3470 −0.3188 −0.3534 −0.2519 −0.1967 −0.2724 −0.1574
(0.1826) (0.2362) (0.3232) (0.3589) (0.2190) (0.2189) (0.2297) (0.2182) (0.3312) (0.3240)
BG_1⁎ dummy (1 = private) 0.2949
(0.3682)
BG_1⁎ dummy (1 = central govt.) −0.0456 0.1586
(0.3512) (0.4210)
BG_1⁎ dummy (1 = local govt.) −0.2221
(0.3661)
BG⁎ dummy (high m-index) −0.1973
(0.3715)
Time effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 6435 4410 1728 1566 4455 6138 6138 6138 4410 6021
R-square 0.181 0.199 0.164 0.192 0.200 0.187 0.187 0.187 0.200 0.185
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Table 8
Business groups and firm performance. This table presents the results of the role of business group affiliation in affecting a firm's operating performance. The sample period is from 1998 to 2006. The dependent variable is a
firm's operating performance measured as ROA (in Panel A) and ROE (in Panel B) and a firm's value measured as Tobin's Q. We run a fixed-effects OLS regression on the business group dummy after controlling for Cash
Flow, Size, Beta, Long-term debt, and Short-term debt. Column 1 shows the whole sample regression results and columns 2 to 5 show the results for the state-owned, private, low level of market development region, and
high level of market development region subsamples, respectively. Columns 6 to 10 present the results for interaction analysis. Standard errors are in parentheses and values significantly different from zero at the 10%, 5%,
and 1% levels are marked with ⁎, ⁎⁎, and ⁎⁎⁎, respectively.
All State-owned Private Low m-index High m-index Interaction analysis
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] [10]
Panel A: ROA as the performance measure
BG 0.0032 0.0085 −0.0046 0.0219⁎⁎ −0.0084 0.0077 0.0043 −0.0019 0.0109 0.0212
(0.007) (0.006) (0.017) (0.010) (0.008) (0.009) (0.008) (0.009) (0.008) (0.013)
BG⁎ dummy (1 = private) −0.0118
(0.014)
BG⁎ dummy (1 = central govt.) −0.0031 −0.0078
(0.015) (0.012)
BG⁎ dummy (1 = local govt.) 0.0135
(0.013)
BG⁎ dummy (high m-index) −0.0243
(0.015)
Long-term Debt −0.0001 0.0004⁎⁎ −0.0031⁎⁎⁎ 0.0034 −0.0001 −0.0000 −0.0000 −0.0000 0.0004⁎⁎ −0.0001
(0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.002) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Short-term Debt 0.0001 −0.0004⁎⁎ 0.0033⁎⁎⁎ −0.0100⁎⁎⁎ 0.0001 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 −0.0004⁎⁎ 0.0001
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.002) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Cash Flow 0.0011⁎⁎⁎ 0.0014⁎⁎⁎ 0.0146⁎⁎⁎ 0.0789⁎⁎⁎ 0.0010⁎⁎⁎ 0.0022⁎⁎⁎ 0.0022⁎⁎⁎ 0.0022⁎⁎⁎ 0.0013⁎⁎⁎ 0.0011⁎⁎⁎
(0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.004) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Size 0.0339⁎⁎⁎ 0.0151⁎⁎⁎ 0.0525⁎⁎⁎ 0.0200⁎⁎⁎ 0.0340⁎⁎⁎ 0.0351⁎⁎⁎ 0.0353⁎⁎⁎ 0.0352⁎⁎⁎ 0.0152⁎⁎⁎ 0.0343⁎⁎⁎
(0.004) (0.004) (0.008) (0.006) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Beta −0.0536⁎⁎⁎ −0.0292⁎⁎⁎ −0.0939⁎⁎⁎ −0.0472⁎⁎⁎ −0.0567⁎⁎⁎ −0.0509⁎⁎⁎ −0.0507⁎⁎⁎ −0.0507⁎⁎⁎ −0.0283⁎⁎⁎ −0.0562⁎⁎⁎
(0.006) (0.005) (0.017) (0.010) (0.008) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.005) (0.006)
Time Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of stock 634 431 181 158 462 617 617 617 435 620
R-square 0.105 0.108 0.186 0.386 0.0959 0.112 0.111 0.111 0.101 0.103
Panel B: ROE as the performance measure
BG 0.1879 0.0250 0.3358 0.0834 0.2495 0.0566 0.1014 −0.0093 0.0697 0.2406
(0.401) (0.048) (0.988) (0.077) (0.541) (0.385) (0.360) (0.401) (0.059) (0.780)
BG⁎ dummy (1 = private) −0.0082
(0.624)
BG⁎ dummy (1 = central govt.) −0.1942 −0.1209
(0.696) (0.093)
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BG⁎ dummy (1 = local govt.) 0.1558
(0.607)
BG⁎ dummy (high m-index) −0.0674
(0.885)
Long-term Debt −0.0752⁎⁎⁎ −0.0015 −0.1380⁎⁎⁎ −0.2444⁎⁎⁎ −0.0711⁎⁎⁎ −0.0563⁎⁎⁎ −0.0563⁎⁎⁎ −0.0563⁎⁎⁎ −0.0030⁎⁎ −0.0751⁎⁎⁎
(0.010) (0.001) (0.039) (0.018) (0.011) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.001) (0.010)
Short-term Debt 0.0731⁎⁎⁎ −0.0087⁎⁎⁎ 0.2000⁎⁎⁎ −0.0877⁎⁎⁎ 0.0698⁎⁎⁎ 0.0647⁎⁎⁎ 0.0647⁎⁎⁎ 0.0647⁎⁎⁎ −0.0080⁎⁎⁎ 0.0731⁎⁎⁎
(0.008) (0.001) (0.022) (0.012) (0.009) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.001) (0.008)
Cash Flow 0.6350⁎⁎⁎ 1.0101⁎⁎⁎ 1.3022⁎⁎⁎ 1.1100⁎⁎⁎ 0.6463⁎⁎⁎ 0.9825⁎⁎⁎ 0.9825⁎⁎⁎ 0.9826⁎⁎⁎ 1.0132⁎⁎⁎ 0.6350⁎⁎⁎
(0.012) (0.002) (0.072) (0.028) (0.013) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.002) (0.012)
Size −0.2268 0.0123 0.5750 0.0359 0.2412 0.3013⁎ 0.3041⁎ 0.3008⁎ 0.0145 −0.2334
(0.217) (0.029) (0.462) (0.041) (0.305) (0.171) (0.171) (0.171) (0.028) (0.222)
Beta −0.3411 −0.0913⁎⁎ 0.3442 −0.3517⁎⁎⁎ −0.0375 −0.1321 −0.1300 −0.1318 −0.0832⁎⁎ −0.3499
(0.366) (0.042) (0.995) (0.073) (0.491) (0.287) (0.287) (0.287) (0.041) (0.375)
Time Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of stock 634 431 181 158 462 617 617 617 435 620
R-square 0.489 0.995 0.388 0.650 0.506 0.734 0.734 0.734 0.993 0.489
Panel C: Tobin's Q as the performance measure
BG 3.0859⁎ −0.0393 4.2753 −0.2180 4.9565⁎⁎ 1.8343 2.9432 4.8455⁎⁎ −0.0152 −1.2209
(1.654) (0.032) (5.111) (0.206) (2.216) (2.078) (1.942) (2.164) (0.040) (3.218)
BG⁎ dummy (1 = private) 3.7559
(3.368)
BG⁎ dummy (1 = central govt.) 0.8403 −0.0676
(3.752) (0.063)
BG⁎ dummy (1 = local govt.) −4.1918
(3.275)
BG⁎ dummy (high m-index) 5.7884
(3.649)
Long-term Debt 0.0649⁎ −0.0014⁎ 0.3000 0.0738 0.0866⁎ 0.0625 0.0629 0.0630 −0.0016⁎ 0.0656⁎
(0.039) (0.001) (0.204) (0.047) (0.045) (0.040) (0.040) (0.040) (0.001) (0.040)
Short-term Debt −0.0369 0.0010 −0.0014 −0.0383 −0.0493 −0.0345 −0.0347 −0.0349 0.0012 −0.0374
(0.033) (0.001) (0.115) (0.032) (0.039) (0.034) (0.034) (0.034) (0.001) (0.034)
Cash Flow 0.0457 −0.0010 0.6599⁎ 0.2084⁎⁎⁎ 0.0617 0.0079 0.0082 0.0078 −0.0010 0.0464
(0.048) (0.001) (0.374) (0.075) (0.055) (0.059) (0.059) (0.059) (0.001) (0.048)
Size −19.8734⁎⁎⁎ −0.3626⁎⁎⁎ −44.6730⁎⁎⁎ −2.0835⁎⁎⁎ −26.6915⁎⁎⁎ −20.4377⁎⁎⁎ −20.5160⁎⁎⁎ −20.4864⁎⁎⁎ −0.3608⁎⁎⁎ −20.2677⁎⁎⁎
(0.896) (0.019) (2.394) (0.110) (1.209) (0.924) (0.924) (0.922) (0.019) (0.914)
Beta −0.0674 −0.1255⁎⁎⁎ 4.1735 0.1201 −0.2014 −0.1358 −0.1784 −0.1748 −0.1256⁎⁎⁎ 0.0684
(1.514) (0.028) (5.151) (0.197) (2.008) (1.549) (1.550) (1.549) (0.028) (1.547)
Time Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of stock 634 431 181 158 462 617 617 617 435 620
R-square 0.0224 0.371 0.0663 0.145 0.0274 0.0232 0.0228 0.0231 0.370 0.0234
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186 J. He et al. / Journal of Corporate Finance 22 (2013) 166–192environment. The result is similar when we use ROE (Panel B) as the performance measure. Although all of the business group
dummy coefficients are positive, they are not statistically significant, which means that affiliated firms barely outperform
nonaffiliated ones in cases of operating results. In addition, ownership and the level of market development have weak effects on
the role of business group in a firm's accounting performance.
We report the results of using Tobin's Q as the proxy for the stock market performance in Panel C. We find that the group
dummy coefficient is significant in the whole sample and in the high m-index subsample. This indicates that the market perceives
a higher valuation for the affiliated firms.
Overall, our findings confirm the internal capital market and risk-sharing hypotheses but do not provide wholly direct strong
evidence of the influence of business group affiliation on firm performance. Regarding the internal capital market role of business
groups, it is more pronounced among private firms, firms owned by local governments, and those operating in highly developed
regions. These findings are consistent with Hypothesis 4 but inconsistent with Hypothesis 5. However, we find some evidence
that supports Hypotheses 4 and 5 regarding the risk-sharing role of business groups. We check the robustness of our empirical
results in the next section.
6. Robustness tests
6.1. More business group characteristics
As described in the Data sources and sample selection section, the group information is obtained from two sources: the data of
the survey conducted by the CSRC and hand-collected data. From the former, we have more information about a specific group,
such as whether financial institutions are affiliated with a group, whether there are H-share stocks of a group listed on the Hong
Kong Stock Exchange, and the number of distinct industries that a group covers. Therefore, we examine the robustness of our
results after taking into account these characteristics.14
First, we consider the effect of financial institution affiliation on a business group.15 Because the Chinese external capital and
arm's-length banking loans markets are under- and unevenly developed, the affiliation of financial institutions with a business
group tends to improve the group's financial flexibility. We construct a dummy variable, FIN, to denote whether financial
institutions are affiliated with a business group. Then we add an interaction term among cash flow, group dummy, and financial
institution dummy in the regression as shown in column 2, Panel A, Table 9. We find a statistically significant negative coefficient
for this interaction term, the magnitude of which is larger than that of the interaction term between just cash flow and group
dummy. This implies that the firms of business groups with financial institution affiliates tend to face fewer financial constraints,
and that financial institutions are an important factor in the role played by business groups as internal capital markets.
Second, we take the role of H-shares into account. Hong Kong has consistently been rated one of the best financial markets in
terms of investor protection, with strong laws and law enforcement institutions. Allen et al. (2005) rank it as one of the best in
overall investor protection along with the United Kingdom, the United States, and Singapore, among others. Hong
Kong-registered public firms are also subject to the higher quality International Financial Reporting Standards, stringent external
auditing, and constant monitoring by a free media and financial intermediaries (e.g., underwriters, analysts, and institutional
investors). Consistent with La Porta et al.'s (1997, 1998) theory that countries with strong investor protection are associated with
larger and broader external financial markets, Allen et al. (2005) find that Hong Kong ranks at the top whereas mainland China is
ranked at the bottom in terms of the size and breadth of external financial markets. Hong Kong's institutional framework, legal
system, and free market fundamentals could influence to some extent the business group effect if the group has H-shares listed on
the Hong Kong Stock Exchange. To investigate this hypothesis, we construct an H-shares dummy that takes a value of 1 if the
group has H-shares listed on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange, and 0 otherwise. As with the financial institution dummy, we focus
on the three-way interaction term among cash flow, group dummy, and H-shares dummy. The estimated coefficient is positive, as
we expect, but insignificant, as shown in column 3.
Third, we consider the impact of the level of firm diversification. The more diversified a group is, the more likely it is that the
group will use its cross-industry internal capital market to finance member firms in need. If a business group has businesses in
different industries, then one member firm's financial constraints induced by shocks in a specific industry may well be mitigated
by member firms in other industries, which have not suffered shocks. We use the ratio of the number of industries in which a
group is involved to the number of listed subsidiaries a group has to proxy the level of diversification. For example, if a group has
five listed firms belonging to the same industry, then the industry coverage is 1/5. We scale by the number of listed firms because
it is hard for a business group with many firms in the same industry to mitigate the financial constraints faced by affiliated
members, which tend to perform similarly and suffer from common industry shocks. Cash flow is interacted with group dummy
and level of diversification, and the results are shown in column 4. The coefficient of the three-way interaction is significantly
negative, which suggests that in a well-diversified business group, financial constraints are more likely to be mitigated, consistent
with our expectation. The value of diversification level is 0 if a firm is not affiliated with any group, so it becomes redundant to
include the interaction between cash flow and group dummy.We rerun the regression after deleting the interaction between cash
flow and group dummy, and the results are reported in column 5. The negative coefficient of the three-way interaction term14 As we do not have additional information in the hand-collected data, we do not include it when doing additional tests. Hence, for the main test, the sample
size shrinks from 629 to 569.
15 Financial institutions include banks, securities companies, fund management companies, insurance companies, trust companies, and so forth.
Table 9
Robustness tests for more group characteristics. This table presents the results of robustness tests taking into account the following firm characteristics: financial
institution affiliation (FIN), H-share effect (H), the level of diversification (Indus), and group cash flow. In Panel A, Column 1 shows the results of the basic
regression without these additional characteristics, while column 2 shows those with financial institution affiliation considered by adding an interaction term
with Cash Flow and the group and financial institution dummies. Column 3 shows the results after adding an interaction term with Cash Flow and the group and
H-share dummies to investigate the H-share effect. Columns 4 and 5 shows the results with the diversification effect considered, which is proxied by the ratio of
the number of industries in which the business group is involved to the number of listed firms within the group. Because the diversification level can indicate a
firm's group affiliation status, we exclude the interaction between Cash Flow and the group dummy in column 5. In Panel B, we consider the group cash flow
effect, in terms of either a single variable or interaction term with firm Cash Flow. We use a fixed-effects OLS model with the same sample period and control
variables used in Table 3. Standard errors are in parentheses and values significantly different from zero at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels are marked with ⁎, ⁎⁎,
and ⁎⁎⁎, respectively.
Panel A: The role of financial institutions, H-shares, and industry coverage in business groups
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5]
Cash flow 0.3969⁎⁎⁎ 0.3972⁎⁎⁎ 0.3965⁎⁎⁎ 0.3958⁎⁎⁎ 0.3956⁎⁎⁎
(0.0123) (0.0123) (0.0123) (0.0123) (0.0121)
Cash flow ∗ BG −0.1468⁎⁎⁎ −0.0815⁎⁎ −0.1825⁎⁎⁎ −0.0067
(0.0293) (0.0374) (0.0518) (0.0785)
Cash flow ∗ BG ∗ FIN −0.1559⁎⁎⁎
(0.0553)
Cash flow ∗ BG ∗ H 0.0506
(0.0605)
Cash flow ∗ BG ∗ Indus −0.2282⁎ −0.2376⁎⁎⁎
(0.1186) (0.0443)
Tobin's Q 0.1562⁎⁎ 0.1542⁎⁎ 0.1572⁎⁎ 0.1544⁎⁎ 0.1543⁎⁎
(0.0644) (0.0644) (0.0644) (0.0644) (0.0644)
Cash holding 1.4031⁎⁎⁎ 1.4403⁎⁎⁎ 1.3958⁎⁎⁎ 1.4110⁎⁎⁎ 1.4111⁎⁎⁎
(0.2140) (0.2142) (0.2142) (0.2139) (0.2139)
Sales −0.1415⁎⁎ −0.1430⁎⁎ −0.1400⁎⁎ −0.1420⁎⁎ −0.1420⁎⁎
(0.0628) (0.0627) (0.0628) (0.0627) (0.0627)
Leverage −0.0064 −0.0029 −0.0074 −0.0053 −0.0054
(0.0786) (0.0786) (0.0787) (0.0786) (0.0786)
Time effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
No. of shares 569 569 569 569 569
R-square 0.260 0.260 0.261 0.262 0.262
Panel B: The role of group cash flow in business groups
[1] [2] [3] [4]
Cash flow 0.1815⁎⁎⁎ 0.1818⁎⁎⁎ 0.2559⁎⁎⁎
(0.0069) (0.0069) (0.0082)
Group cash flow 0.0108 −0.0228 0.0614⁎⁎
(0.0283) (0.0263) (0.0261)
Cash flow ∗ group CF −0.0643⁎⁎⁎
(0.0040)
Tobin's Q 0.1317⁎⁎ 0.1676⁎⁎ 0.1341⁎⁎ 0.1575⁎⁎
(0.0631) (0.0680) (0.0632) (0.0615)
Cash holding 1.3727⁎⁎⁎ 1.8262⁎⁎⁎ 1.3782⁎⁎⁎ 1.6253⁎⁎⁎
(0.2139) (0.2296) (0.2140) (0.2087)
Sales −0.1282⁎⁎ −0.1053 −0.1284⁎⁎ −0.1455⁎⁎
(0.0629) (0.0676) (0.0629) (0.0612)
Leverage −0.0639 −0.1438⁎ −0.0649 −0.0524
(0.0778) (0.0837) (0.0779) (0.0757)
Time effect Yes Yes Yes Yes
No. of shares 629 629 629 629
R-square 0.187 0.0196 0.187 0.231
187J. He et al. / Journal of Corporate Finance 22 (2013) 166–192becomes more significant, which strengthens our argument that the level of firm diversification within a business group is an
important factor in shaping the internal capital market.
We use the group dummy to proxy a firm's affiliation status in all of the above tests. We can calculate the group cash flow for
any specific group by combining the cash flows of all of the member firms and scaling the total (group) cash flow by the total
group capital stock at the beginning of the period (group cash flow is assigned a value of 0 if a firm is not group affiliated).16 Then
we can investigate whether the investment of a firm, if it is in a group, is associated with the group cash flow, besides its own cash
flow. The results are shown in Panel B of Table 9. Column 1 shows the results of the regression of investment on a firm's own cash
flow. The coefficient is significantly positive. We replace own cash flow by group cash flow in column 2, but the results are not
significant. Then we include both own cash flow and group cash flow in the regression, but the effect of group cash flow is still16 In fact, it is just an approximation of the total cash ﬂow of the group, because we include only a group's listed ﬁrms and ignore its members that are not
publicly traded.
188 J. He et al. / Journal of Corporate Finance 22 (2013) 166–192weak. Column 4 shows the results after adding an interaction term between own cash flow and group cash flow. The coefficient is
negative and significant, whereas the coefficient of group cash flow becomes positive and significant. We interpret the results to
mean that a firm's investment is positively related to the cash flow of the group with which it is affiliated, as well as its own cash
flow. Sufficient group cash flow can weaken the dependency of firm investment on the firm's own cash flow. This finding provides
additional evidence of the role played by a business group as an internal capital market for member firms.
6.2. Alternative ﬁnancial constraint measures
The literature provides alternative ways to measure a firm's financial constraints, which include the financial constraint index
developed by Whited (1992, 1998) and Whited and Wu (2006). Their method estimates a nonlinear investment Euler equation
using a generalized method of moments (GMM) framework to construct a linear representation of several key financial terms to
estimate a firm's financial constraint index.
Based on Eq. (10) inWhited andWu (2006), the basic nonlinear investment Euler equation to be estimated is as follows17:17 TheMt;tþ1Λ i;tþ1
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þ 1þ ei;tþ1:Yi,t is output, and Ci,t is the variable cost: the sum of “cost of goods sold” and “selling and administrative expenses.” Ii,t is capital
investment, and Ki,t is capital stock. Mt,t + 1 is the reduced-form specification for the stochastic discount factor, and we use the
CAPM model: Mt,t + 1 = rf + β(rm − rf). Λi,t + 1, as introduced by Whited and Wu (2006), takes the form of Λ i;tþ1 ¼ 1þλi;tþ11þλi;t . The
λi,t + 1 is unobservable, and we deem it a function of several observable firm characteristics, such that λi,t + 1 = β0 + βX. Both
Mt,t + 1 and λi,t + 1 are substituted into the above main equation, and the parameters μ and αm, as well as β0 and β in λi,t + 1's
representation, are estimated jointly using the GMM to estimate the conditional moment conditions of the formEt1 zi;t−1⊗ ei;tþ1−ei;t
 h i
:The instruments include all Euler equation variables as well inventories, depreciation, current assets, current liabilities, and tax
payments, all of which are scaled by total assets. As demonstrated by Whited and Wu (2006), the fitted value of λi,t + 1 is the
index of a firm's financial constraints. The higher is λi,t + 1, the greater is the effect of financial constraints.
To address the issue in this paper, we estimate the Euler equation using the GMMwith the highest order M of αm as 3, and five
key financial items to represent the specification of λi,t + 1: TLTD, the ratio of long-term debt to total assets; SG, firm sales growth;
LNTA, the natural log of total assets; CF, the ratio of cash flow to total assets; and ISG, the firm's industry sales growth.
The GMM estimation results are shown in Table 10. Panel A shows the estimated coefficients and standard errors of the
parameters. Then we use the estimated coefficients to get the fitted value of λi,t + 1 for each firm year, which proxies the extent of
financial constraints. Panel B presents the statistics of the index of financial constraints of our sample. We find that the index is
lower for group-affiliated than for stand-alone firms (3.0256 versus 3.0320, respectively), and the difference (−0.0064) is
significant. Panel C shows the results when we take the index of financial constraints as the dependent variable, and the group
dummy as well as the ownership and institutional dummies as regressors to run a fixed-effects OLS regression. The results are
generally consistent with the above tests. Group affiliates have a lower financial constraint index, and this relationship is more
significant among the firms owned by local governments relative to the ones owned by central government and those located in
regions or provinces with a high level of market development. However, for private firms, group affiliates show a relatively higher
financial constraint index, which is not consistent with the result above.
6.3. Endogeneity and sample-selection issues
The OLS regressions, as noted in prior studies (e.g., Khanna, 2000), are prone to selection bias and a potential endogeneity
problem, as the group-affiliation sample may be selected based on some unobservable factors and these factors could influence
the variation in financial constraints across firms. This potentiality creates a bias in the estimation of the coefficients of cash flow–
investment sensitivity and the interaction term between cash flow and group dummy. We use the Heckman (1979) two-stage
method to take into account self-selection bias. In the first stage, we estimate a probit model of group affiliation (dummy) on a set
of variables that tend to influence a firm's group affiliation choice. Then we include the Lambda (inverse Mills' ratio) based on the
probit estimate in the previous regression specifications to control for potential self-selection bias.details of the estimation procedure can be found in Whited (1992, 1998) and Whited and Wu (2006).
Table 10
Robustness tests using an alternative measure. This table presents the results when we use the alternative financial constraint measure of Whited and Wu (WW)
(2006). Panel A reports the GMM estimate of the Euler equation with a highest order of 3, using the following variables to fit financial constraints: TLTD, the ratio
of the long-term debt to total assets; SG, firm sales growth; LNTA, the natural log of total assets; CF, the ratio of cash flow to total assets; and ISG, the firm's
industry sales growth. Panel B shows the basic statistics of the constructed financial constraint index for the full sample and group-affiliated and stand-alone
subsamples based on the results of Panel A. In Panel C, we regress the WW financial constraint index on the business group dummy, as well as its interaction
terms with ownership type andmarket development level, respectively. Standard errors are in parentheses and values significantly different from zero at the 10%,
5%, and 1% levels are marked with ⁎, ⁎⁎, and ⁎⁎⁎, respectively.
Panel A: GMM estimation results
μ a2 a3 β0 TLTD SG LNTA CF ISG
Coefficient (10−2) 1.5898 5.3710 −0.0017 340.3968 0.3805 1.1819 −1.7561 −0.1666 −0.7813
Standard err (10−2) 0.0936 0.5537 0.0002 0.0031 0.0036 1.2429 0.0631 0.0076 0.2908
Observations 4122
J-test 748.5118 p value: ≈1.0000
L-test 731.5006 p value: ≈1.0000
Panel B: Descriptive statistics for the WW financial constraint index
WW FC-index All Group-affiliated Stand-alone Mean diff
Mean 3.0299 3.0256 3.0320 −0.0064⁎⁎⁎
Median 3.0314 3.0271 3.0333 (0.0013)
Std dev 0.0358 0.0383 0.0344
Observations 4032 1276 2756
Panel C: The role of business groups in financial constraints
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6]
BG −0.0062⁎⁎⁎ −0.0090⁎⁎⁎ −0.0069⁎⁎ −0.0026 −0.0122⁎⁎⁎ 0.0028
(0.0023) (0.0028) (0.0027) (0.0030) (0.0038) (0.0049)
BG⁎ dummy (1 = private) 0.0081⁎
(0.0046)
BG⁎ dummy (1 = central govt.) 0.0021 0.0068
(0.0049) (0.0058)
BG⁎ dummy (1 = local govt.) −0.0092⁎⁎
(0.0045)
BG⁎ dummy (1 = high m-index) −0.0122⁎⁎
(0.0054)
Time effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
No. of shares 448 439 439 439 340 422
R-square 0.0381 0.0378 0.0384 0.0393 0.0304 0.0370
189J. He et al. / Journal of Corporate Finance 22 (2013) 166–192We use two sets of variables to estimate a firm's group affiliation choice. The first includes the same variables that are used as
control ones in the above regressions: cash holding, sales, and leverage. To capture the potential determination of group affiliation
choice, we also include long-term debt, short-term debt, sales growth, and earnings performance (ROA). Both sets of variables
include the lagged group dummy to try to capture the reinforcement effect. The results of the first-stage estimation are shown in
Panel A in Table 11. Because of the different sample sizes, we estimate the probit model separately for the two samples. Columns 1
and 2 show the results based on the basic sample (including ownership information), and columns 3 and 4 show the results based
on the sample including market development level information.
Then, based on the estimation using the two sets of variables, we get two Lambdas (inverse Mills' ratio): Lambda 1 (from
columns 1 and 3 in Panel A) and Lambda 2 (from columns 2 and 4 in the same panel). We include these two Lambdas or the
interaction between them and cash flow to control for potential self-selection bias. This does not weaken our previous results, as
shown in Panel B (using Lambda 1) and Panel C (using Lambda 2), although the interaction term between cash flow and Lambda
is significantly negative, which partially reflects the effect of group affiliation choice on cash flow–investment sensitivity.
7. Conclusion
Business groups are ubiquitous in emerging markets. They are an endogenous response to the economic and institutional
environment and may play a positive role by making up for underdeveloped economic institutions. The evidence of the wealth
effects of business groups is mixed. In this paper, we investigate whether business groups in China act as internal capital markets,
in an environment that is characterized by a high level of government intervention, a weak legal system, and an underdeveloped
financial market. We study how institutional factors, such as the ultimate owner and level of market development, shape the role
of these business groups. We find that business groups help member firms overcome constraints in raising external capital, and
that the internal capital market within a business group is more likely to be an alternative financing channel among state-owned
than among private firms. This is because most business groups in China were formed through a state-controlled process of
reorganization. Hence, they are bound to help each other. We also find that the internal capital market is more likely to help those
Table 11
Robustness tests for potential self-selection bias. This table reports the results of robustness testing after controlling for potential self-selection bias using the
Heckman (1979) two-stage method. In Panel A, we obtain the Lambda (inverse Mills' ratio) from the first-stage probit model of a firm's group affiliation choice.
We include the following two sets of explanatory variables in the first-stage probit model. The first set of variables is the same as that in the previous regressions,
used as control variables: Cash Holding, Sales, and Leverage (Lambda 1), while the second set also includes Long-term Debt, Short-term Debt, Sales Growth, and
ROA (Lambda 2). Both sets include the lagged group dummy to capture the reinforcement effect. Columns 1 and 2 show the results based on the basic sample
(including ownership information) and columns 3 and 4 show the results based on the sample including market development level information. In Panels B and
C, we add the estimated Lambda (Lambda 1 and Lambda 2, respectively) to control for self-selection bias. Standard errors are in parentheses and values
significantly different from zero at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels are marked with ⁎, ⁎⁎, and ⁎⁎⁎, respectively.
Panel A: First-stage estimation to get Lambda (inverse Mills' ratio)
[1] [2] [3] [4]
Lagged group dummy 3.8377⁎⁎⁎ 3.8292⁎⁎⁎ 3.8054⁎⁎⁎ 3.8006⁎⁎⁎
(0.0945) (0.0948) (0.0951) (0.0952)
Cash holding 0.4403⁎⁎ 0.4485⁎ 0.4402⁎⁎ 0.4348⁎
(0.2214) (0.2379) (0.2237) (0.2403)
Sales 0.1198⁎⁎ 0.1326⁎⁎ 0.1195⁎⁎ 0.1317⁎⁎
(0.0504) (0.0554) (0.0511) (0.0562)
Leverage 0.0191 0.0695 0.0250 0.0698
(0.0759) (0.1373) (0.0734) (0.1374)
Long-term debt −0.2093 −0.2363
(0.4009) (0.4162)
Short-term debt 0.0415 0.0649
(0.3128) (0.3174)
Sales growth −0.0587 −0.0555
(0.0397) (0.0390)
ROA 0.4445 0.4661
(0.4715) (0.4734)
Time effect Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 5032 5003 4736 4724
Number of shares 629 627 592 591
Log likelihood −802.3 −799.1 −769.1 −766.5
Panel B: Regression controlling for self-selection bias (Lambda 1)
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6]
Cash flow 0.3912⁎⁎⁎ 0.3842⁎⁎⁎ 0.3808⁎⁎⁎ 0.3710*** 0.3913⁎⁎⁎ 0.3848⁎⁎⁎
(0.0120) (0.0124) (0.0121) (0.0125) (0.0124) (0.0128)
Cash flow ∗ BG −0.2952⁎⁎⁎ −0.2847⁎⁎⁎ −0.0868⁎⁎ −0.0579 −0.2646 −0.2352
(0.0142) (0.0149) (0.0342) (0.0353) (0.2088) (0.2080)
Tobin's Q 0.1414⁎⁎ 0.1458⁎⁎ 0.1116⁎ 0.1163⁎ 0.1477⁎⁎ 0.1519⁎⁎
(0.0603) (0.0602) (0.0607) (0.0607) (0.0631) (0.0631)
Cash holding 1.4231⁎⁎⁎ 1.4537⁎⁎⁎ 1.5399⁎⁎⁎ 1.5901⁎⁎⁎ 1.4770⁎⁎⁎ 1.5056⁎⁎⁎
(0.2042) (0.2046) (0.2084) (0.2086) (0.2147) (0.2152)
Sales −0.1456⁎⁎ −0.1482⁎⁎ −0.1348⁎⁎ −0.1381⁎⁎ −0.1522⁎⁎ −0.1551⁎⁎
(0.0600) (0.0600) (0.0599) (0.0598) (0.0625) (0.0624)
Leverage −0.0013 −0.0022 0.0168 0.0163 −0.0044 −0.0052
(0.0743) (0.0743) (0.0742) (0.0741) (0.0769) (0.0769)
Lambda 1 0.0232 0.0043 0.0243
(0.0534) (0.0545) (0.0564)
Cash flow ∗ Lambda 1 −0.0550⁎⁎ −0.0797⁎⁎⁎ −0.0499⁎
(0.0253) (0.0254) (0.0262)
Cash Flow ∗ BG⁎ dummy (1 = private) −0.2102⁎⁎⁎ −0.2252⁎⁎⁎
(0.0335) (0.0337)
Cash Flow ∗ BG⁎ dummy (high m-index) −0.0309 −0.0505
(0.2086) (0.2077)
Time effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of shares 629 629 605 605 592 592
R-square 0.261 0.261 0.259 0.259 0.261 0.262
Panel C: Regression controlling for self-selection bias (Lambda 2)
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6]
Cash flow 0.3732⁎⁎⁎ 0.3639⁎⁎⁎ 0.3808⁎⁎⁎ 0.3691⁎⁎⁎ 0.3732⁎⁎⁎ 0.3640⁎⁎⁎
(0.0119) (0.0122) (0.0121) (0.0124) (0.0122) (0.0126)
Cash flow ∗ BG −0.2776⁎⁎⁎ −0.2634⁎⁎⁎ −0.0869⁎⁎ −0.0494 −0.2512 −0.2097
(0.0140) (0.0146) (0.0342) (0.0352) (0.2050) (0.2041)
Tobin's Q 0.1219⁎⁎ 0.1251⁎⁎ 0.1116⁎ 0.1140⁎ 0.1271⁎⁎ 0.1300⁎⁎
(0.0595) (0.0594) (0.0607) (0.0606) (0.0620) (0.0620)
Cash holding 1.4990⁎⁎⁎ 1.5438⁎⁎⁎ 1.5400⁎⁎⁎ 1.6048⁎⁎⁎ 1.5412⁎⁎⁎ 1.5873⁎⁎⁎
(0.2018) (0.2021) (0.2084) (0.2084) (0.2111) (0.2114)
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Table 11 (continued)
Panel C: Regression controlling for self-selection bias (Lambda 2)
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6]
Sales −0.1360⁎⁎ −0.1391⁎⁎ −0.1349⁎⁎ −0.1383⁎⁎ −0.1424⁎⁎ −0.1461⁎⁎
(0.0591) (0.0590) (0.0599) (0.0598) (0.0614) (0.0613)
Leverage 0.0073 0.0026 0.0168 0.0114 0.0043 −0.0006
(0.0732) (0.0731) (0.0742) (0.0740) (0.0756) (0.0755)
Lambda 2 0.0233 0.0051 0.0249
(0.0527) (0.0546) (0.0555)
Cash flow ∗ lambda 2 −0.0831⁎⁎⁎ −0.1093⁎⁎⁎ −0.0821⁎⁎⁎
(0.0257) (0.0262) (0.0263)
Cash flow ∗ BG⁎ dummy (1 = private) −0.2102⁎⁎⁎ −0.2306⁎⁎⁎
(0.0335) (0.0337)
Cash flow ∗ BG⁎ dummy (high m-index) −0.0266 −0.0540
(0.2048) (0.2038)
Time effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of shares 627 627 605 605 591 591
R-square 0.253 0.254 0.259 0.260 0.253 0.254
191J. He et al. / Journal of Corporate Finance 22 (2013) 166–192affiliated firms which are private, local government owned relative to those owned by central government, or located in regions
with a well-developed institutional environment. We present evidence of the role of business groups in risk sharing among
affiliated firms, but find that business group affiliation has no impact on firm performance. This study sheds new light on the
theory of the firm and its boundaries, and provides a better understanding of China's rapidly growing economy.
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